In November 1976 DAVID PHILLIPS told the HSCA that the CIA monitored and taped OSWALD'S telephone conversations with the Soviet Embassy. The tape was transcribed by a CIA employee and then routinely destroyed. [The Washingtonian 11.80] Gaeton Fonzi developed evidence that William Coleman and David Slawson both heard scratchy versions of the tape. [Last Invest. p286] As of 1993, only the transcripts remained.

PHILLIPS was asked about the tap and the tapes during the course of HUNT v. ajweberman: "Of course, I do know about it. Obviously I cannot, and will not, answer that question." A Letter Head Memorandum from J. Edgar Hoover to President Lyndon B. Johnson on November 23, 1963, "set forth the fact that Agents reviewed the tape, and concluded the voice was not that of OSWALD." During SENSTUDY, (a review of FBI files on behalf of the SSCIA) it was determined that the CIA on November 23, 1963, "provided our Legal Attache in Mexico City with a transcript of said tape recording and advised the Legal Attache that the original tape had been erased..." Recently, the CIA released a document that stated "the tape of the first conversation (September 28, 1963) had been erased before the second call (October 1, 1963) had been received...On November 26, 1963, the Mexico Desk of the Western Hemisphere Division disseminated a transcript of the telephone call of September 28, 1963, and a transcript of the telephone call made on October 1, 1963, in which the caller identified himself as LEE OSWALD. The Desk included a transcript of three other telephone calls made on September 27, 1963, October 1, 1963, and October 3, 1963. The desk commented that 'Voice comparisons indicated that the 'North American' who participated in several of these conversations is probably the person who identified himself as LEE OSWALD on October 1, 1963.' (CSCI-3/778,829) This latter statement is not entirely accurate. According to a previous cable from Mexico City - MEXI 7023, November 23, 1963, - the tapes of the September 28, 1963, telephone call had been erased. If that were so, the tape of the September 27, 1963, call must have been erased. (deleted)."

The CIA was clearly confused on this issue. Evidence suggested that the tape recordings were destroyed after the assassination, not routinely destroyed before the assassination, as PHILLIPS claimed.

On OCTOBER 8, 1963, a cable went out from the CIA's Mexico City Station to the component of the CIA that logged American's contacts with the Soviets:

Origin: LADILLINGER

Distribution: Commo; Chronology; Soviet Contacts 50-8-10-6

ROUTINE

To Director Info. Cite Mexi 6453

LC IMPROVE

1. According LIENVOY On October 1, 1963, American male who spoke broken Russian and said his name was LEE OSWALD (phonetic), stated he was at Soviet Embassy on September 28, 1963, when he spoke with Consul who he believed to be Valeriy Vladimipovich Kostikov. Subject asked Soviet guard Ivan Obyedkov who answered, if there anything new regarding telegram to Washington. Obyedkov, upon checking, said nothing received yet, but request had been sent.

2. Have photos male appears be American entering Soviet Embassy 12:16 p.m., leaving 12:22 p.m. on October 1, 1963, apparent age 35, athletic build, circa 6 feet, receding hairline, blading [sic] top. Wore khakis and sport shirt. Source LIEMPTY

3. No local dissem.

Authenticating Officer Releasing Officer

LADILLINGER Willard C. Curtis

ORIGINATED BY (DELETED) WIFE OF (DELETED).

On OCTOBER 9, 1963 the Director of the CIA was sent this cable:

October 9, 1963.

To: Director.

From: Mexico City.

Action: Western Hemisphere 8

Info:

CI [Counter-Intelligence-ANGLETON'S General Staff]

CI/OPS [Counter-Intelligence / Operations]

CI/IC 2 [Counter-Intelligence/ IC]

FI [Foreign Intelligence]

SR 7 [Soviet Russia - Division 7]

RF [?]

VR [?]

ROUTING: Bustos

Secret 090043Z

DIR CITE MEXI 6453

LCIMPROVE

1. According LIENVOY On October 1, 1963, American male who spoke broken Russian and said his name was LEE OSWALD (phonetic), stated he was at Soviet Embassy on September 28, 1963, when he spoke with Consul who he believed to be Valeriy Vladimipovich Kostikov. Subject asked Soviet guard Ivan Obyedkov who answered, if there anything new regarding telegram to Washington. Obyedkov, upon checking, said nothing received yet, but request had been sent.

2. Have photos male, appears be American entering Soviet Embassy 12:16 p.m., leaving 12:22 p.m. on October 1, 1963, apparent age 35, athletic build, circa 6 feet, receding hairline, blading [sic] top. Wore khakis and sport shirt. Source LIEMPTY

3. No local dissemination.

WC Curtis releasing officer. D:200-5-41 Mexi 6534 October 15, 1963, Requested pouch photo OSWALD 201-289,248 October 9, 1963.

A document dated January 31, 1964, that the CIA gave to the Warren Commission, stated that news of the OSWALD/Ivan Obyedkov telephone conversation was cabled to CIA Headquarters "the same day it was received. A file check in Washington which is routine in these matters revealed the possibility of an identity between the LEE OSWALD who had spoken with Ivan Obyedkov, and presumably with Kostikov, and the defector returnee, LEE HARVEY OSWALD."

The cable from the Mexico City CIA Station, to Headquarters, went out nine days later (October 9, 1963), and not on the day after the transcripts had been reviewed.

In Nightwatch, PHILLIPS wrote: "Craig, [Ladillinger] the Case Officer in charge of Soviet Operations, was the first to become aware of OSWALD on the basis of the latter's contact with the Soviet Embassy...Craig procrastinated...his wife typed out the cable." [PHILLIPS Nightwatch p80 et. al.]

In 1977 the CIA generated a document titled, "Delay in Sending the First Cable about OSWALD," which stated:

1. Much has been written about the delay (by the Mexico Station) in sending the first cable requesting traces on the name LEE OSWALD. It was discussed in DAVE PHILLIPS' book as a case of laziness on the part of the Soviet case officer (which, in my view, was unjust and unnecessary and indicates that DAVE PHILLIPS did not know what he was talking about).

2. Normally, the Spanish transcript for the October 1, 1963, conversation would have been picked up upon the morning of October 2, 1963. The Russian language portion would have gone to the Russian/English transcriber on October 3, 1963. The translation would have been returned the following day (October 4, 1963), at which time the Soviet case officer would have asked for the photographic coverage. That coverage would not have been in the station before October 7, 1963, since the film was still in the camera on the October 3, 1963, and it was picked-up probably on the October 4, 1963, processed and passed to the Station on the next work day which would have been Monday, October 7, 1963.

3. Later, the film was taken out of the camera every day, but at that time, the film stayed in the camera until a full roll was completed, which might take three or four days.

4. A name trace could have been requested on the basis of the name alone, but that wasn't the way Winston Scott ran that Station. He wanted the photographic coverage tied in with the telephone coverage. Sometimes there was a U.S. automobile license number. It was also part of the numbers game of justifying a project by the number of dispatches, cables, or reports, produced. [NARA 1993.07.0616:17:21:930150]

On OCTOBER 10, 1963, CIA Headquarters sent the Mexico City CIA Station a cable that read:

Origin: C. BUSTOS:jpm

Unit: Western Hemisphere/3/Mexico.

Ext: 5940. To Mexico City

From Director

Conf Western Hemisphere 8,

Info ADDP [Assistant Director/Directorate Plans] CI, CI/OPS, CI/SP [Counter-Intelligence/Special Projects Group] FI, SR7, RF, VR. .

To Mexi Ref: Mexi 6453 (IN 36017)*

1. LEE OSWALD who called SOVEMB on October 1, 1963, probably identical LEE HENRY OSWALD (201-289,248) born October 18, 1939, New Orleans, former radar operator in the United States Marines who defected to USSR in October 1959."

The cable contained a description of OSWALD, background on OSWALD'S defection and re-defection, including his statement that he wished to return to the United States if "we could come to some agreement concerning the dropping of any legal proceedings against me."

3. Latest Headquarters information was ODACID [State Department] report dated May 1962, saying ODACID had determined OSWALD is still US citizen, and both he and his Soviet wife have exit permits, and the Department of State had given approval for their travel with their infant child to USA.

4. Station should pass information reference and paragraph one to TPELIDE, ODENVY [FBI], ODOATH, [NAVY] and ODURGE [Immigration and Naturalization Service] locally. Information paragraphs two and three originates with ODACID.

5. Reference and possible identification being disseminated to Headquarters of ODENVY, ODACID, ODOATH, and ODURGE. Please keep Headquarters advised on any further contacts or positive identification of OSWALD.

Western Hemisphere Comment: According to LIENVOY October 1, 1963, an American male who spoke broken Russian said he name LEE OSWALD (phonetic) stated he was at the Soviet Embassy on September 28, 1963, when he spoke with Consul. He discussed sending a telegram to Washington. No local Dissemination had been made.

T. Karamessines ADDP SR/CI/A/Roll (in draft) - [Stephen Roll] William Hood,

Releasing Officer CI/Liaison/Roman (in draft) J.C. KING

CI/SPG/Egerter (in draft) CWHD

Authenticating Officer

C/WH/3 (Scelso)

WH/COPS

[Another version contained the name "J. White."]

The Counter-Intelligence Special Projects Group was the Israeli Desk. The document should have read CI/SIG. William Hood was questioned about this document in November 1993: "Is that the real OSWALD? The 'Henry' puts me off. Is the birth date correct? Do you know how many documents I looked at each day? I almost certainly didn't originate it. I would have released it."

The document contained this stamp: "See Sanitized File A, Number 3, For Sterile copy of this document." No date was affixed to the stamp, which meant it originated when the document did. Thomas B. Ross and David Wise reported that when John McCone became the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency in 1962 he instructed "the Plans Division to keep the Intelligence Division [Counter-Intelligence] posted on all its activities. Thereafter, the Intelligence Division received 'Sanitized' reports (names of agents removed) on all current operations." [Ross & Wise Inv. Gov. p239] J. C. KING, Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division was the Authenticating Officer.

Colonel J.C. King was stationed in Argentina from 1941 to 1945, and in Guatemala from 1952 to 1953. In December 1956, J.C. King met with HUNT in Cuba. During this meeting, J.C. King stated that Fidel Castro had been heavily involved in Bogotazo riots. On December 11, 1959, Colonel J.C. King wrote a memorandum to the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles, which observed that the far left dictatorship which existed in Cuba would, if permitted to stand, encourage undesirable actions against United States holdings in other Latin American countries. One of J.C. King's four recommended actions was that: "Thorough consideration be given to the elimination of Fidel Castro...Many informed people believe that the disappearance of Fidel would greatly accelerate the fall of the present government." Richard Bissell told the SSCIA that he discussed with J.C. King using syndicate members in a Fidel Castro assassination attempt. [SSCIA, Alleged Ass. Plots Inv. For. Lead. 11.20.75 p93] J.C. King was Chief of the Western Hemisphere Division of the CIA during the Bay of Pigs. HUNT reported that J.C. King was the "general factotum" of the Green Committee, a Bay of Pigs fact-finding body comprising United States Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Allen Dulles and retired General Maxwell Taylor. HUNT wrote that its "unannounced aim became clear: to whitewash the New Frontier by heaping guilt on CIA." [HUNT Day p213] STURGIS knew Colonel J.C. King and reported "he was the top man for the Bay of Pigs Brigade in Central America."

HEMMING told this researcher: "If OSWALD was used for a task in the Soviet Union and Hood knew about it, along with a group of other people within his own office, would he call attention to himself by looking into OSWALD? Fuck, no. If you are a cohort, and you're involved in dirty business, are you going to build a file that's traceable to you? He's a defector. He goes to a communist embassy in a foreign country. Of course they're going to be interested in him. How many turkeys like this you think were floating around? ANGLETON had a heavy fucking responsibility in this."

The Counter-Intelligence Section of the CIA sent a telex to agencies that might have an interest in OSWALD; the FBI, the State Department and the Navy Department. The CIA explained: "Our Mexico City Station very often produces information on U.S. citizens contacting Soviet bloc embassies in Mexico City. Frequently the information we get is extremely incriminating, and on one or two occasions we have been able to apprehend and return to the U.S.A. American military personnel attempting to defect. In all such cases, our Headquarters desk requests and obtains the special permission of the Deputy Director for Plans to pass the derogatory information on a U.S. citizen to other government agencies. Derogatory information on Americans is not treated routinely; in each case the DDP or his Assistant personally scrutinize the information, make sure it is credible, and decide whether and to whom it will be passed. Only in absolute emergencies is the Mexico City Station authorized to pass such information directly to the FBI office in the U.S. Embassy...To avoid crossing lines with the FBI, our Mexico Station undertook no local investigation of its own. As we now know, OSWALD left Mexico on October 3, 1963, and was no longer there when our report was put out. (Deleted). November 22, 1963. When word of the shooting reached our operating divisions and staffs on the afternoon of Friday November 22, 1963, transistor radios were turned on everywhere to follow the tragedy. When the name of LEE OSWALD was heard, the effect was electric. A phone message from the FBI came at about the same time, naming OSWALD as the possible assassin and asking for traces. The message was passed on at once by the Chief CI, Mr. ANGLETON, to Mr. Birch O'Neal of his Special Investigations Unit. (Deleted) of this unit immediately recognized the name of LEE OSWALD and went for his file. At the same time, (Deleted) of the Mexico Desk, who had written our first report on OSWALD on October 19, 1963, recognized the name from radio reports and went after the same file. (Deleted) Mexico Desk Chief, who was home on leave, heard the news and phoned in a reminder that we had something on OSWALD."

The Secret Service was not sent a copy of this report, although OSWALD had been in contact with KGB Agent Valeriy Kostikov, a KGB assassin. Did ANGLETON make sure this information was not given to the United States Secret Service so that OSWALD could play his part in the assassination of President John F. Kennedy undisturbed by that Agency? Although not listed as recipient on the cable, the CIA claimed the United States Secret Service received the information electronically, and it was "printed out in their communications section." The Warren Report stated: "No information concerning LEE HARVEY OSWALD appeared in Protective Research Service files prior to the President's trip to Dallas." [ltr. 8.18.77 Gene Wilson/CIA/AJ ajweberman with enc. R162612Z 10.11.63; WR p433]

This telex began:

ORIGIN. C. BUSTOS:jpm.

UNIT: Western Hemisphere/3/Mexico

EXT: 5940

DATE: October 10, 1963

CONF. Western Hemisphere 8

INFO: CI, CI/OPS, CI/SI, FI, SR 7, RF, VR...

1. On October 1, 1963, a reliable and sensitive source in Mexico reported that an American male, who identified himself as LEE OSWALD, contacted the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City...

This document contained the description of the man seen entering the Soviet Embassy, along with the information that OSWALD was a defector who had contact with Valeriy Kostikov. The document was signed

Jane Roman CI/SIG/Egerter (in draft) L.N. GALLARY

CI/Liaison SR/CI/Roll (in draft) C/WH/R

Releasing Officer. Coordinating Officer Authenticating Officer

When the Department of State received its copy, it sent copies to its Department of Security and Consular Affairs, Passport Office, Soviet Department, American Republics Research and Analysis Office, the First Consul and Ambassador at the American Embassy, Mexico City, and to Intelligence and Research. [DOS ltr. Abrams/Cheyes 1.17.64 rel. 5.25.76] The CIA released these cables, with attached transmittal forms. The copy sent to the Passport Office was destroyed in an accident which occurred while it was being copied. The numerous versions exhibited certain minute differences. In one version, that was supposedly identical with the others, (possibly the one sent to the American Ambassador to Mexico), the CIA has deleted the contents of the document and its transmittal slip. The only information on the slip was "CS Copy," part of a sensitivity sticker, and a U.S. Government Printing Office form number, which was different from the form numbers on the other transmittal slips. [WCE 948 pp. 6, 11, 16]

When the FBI, Mexico City, received its copy on October 18, 1963, it increased its interest in OSWALD. The Dallas FBI was notified about OSWALD'S visit, and was ordered to notify William C. Sullivan, of the Counter-Espionage Section of the FBI, if OSWALD'S name came up in any context. FBI Mexico City Legal Attache Clark Anderson arranged with the CIA to follow up on this cable and to verify OSWALD'S entry into Mexico.

On Friday, September 27, 1963, and on Saturday, September 28, 1963, OSWALD talked over a tapped telephone line. Sylvia Duran made several references to OSWALD over another tapped line. She furnished descriptive data on him. The CIA claimed that it could not associate the OSWALD who spoke to Ivan Obyedkov on October 1, 1963, with the North American who had been picked up on telephone taps of the Soviet Embassy and the Soviet Military Attache, asking for a visa. The CIA also claimed it did not associate OSWALD with the North American Sylvia Duran referred to when she spoke with the Soviets. Winston Scott's secretary, Ann Goodpasture, wrote: "Winston Scott, who wrote this paragraph saying that OSWALD was of great interest during this period, is also the same man who signed all of the cables and dispatches attesting to the fact that the calls from the Cuban Embassy by OSWALD (and visits there) were not identified as OSWALD, or even reported by the Station Officers investigating Cuban activities (DAVID PHILLIPS), until after November 23, 1963. This material, and the briefing on it, was the basis for the Warren Commission Report. Thus Scott clearly contradicts himself and departs from the records in the files. There is an explanation perhaps, for this statement by Scott. He was a very proud and egotistical man, and would have interpreted the Warren Commission statement on page 777 (that the Cuban Embassy connection was not discovered until after the assassination) as a criticism and dereliction of duty on the part of the Station. I think that Scott was disappointed that the Warren Commission did not make it appear that the Station had connected these calls with OSWALD before the assassination. Ann Goodpasture." [CIA h/w notes by A.G. 8.10.77; NARA 1993.07.21.19:46:41:210590]

In 1977 Sylvia Duran was asked if she said "LEE HARVEY OSWALD," rather than "North American," when she spoke to the Soviets. She said she supposed that she used the name "OSWALD." The transcripts revealed that she did not.

A Memorandum for the Ambassador drafted by Winston Scott on October 16, 1963, titled "LEE OSWALD/Contact With the Soviet Embassy" began:

"The following information was received from a usually reliable and extremely sensitive source. On October 1, 1963, an American male contacted the Soviet Embassy and identified himself as LEE HARVEY OSWALD. This Officer determined that OSWALD had been at the Soviet Embassy on September 28, 1963, and had talked with Valeriy Kostikov, a member of the Consular Section, in order to learn if the Soviet Embassy had received a reply from Washington concerning his request. We have no clarifying information with regard to this request."

Copies of this memorandum were also sent to "The Minister; Counselor for Political Affairs; Regional Security Officer; Legal Attache; Naval Attache; Liaison with Legal Attache; Liaison with Naval Attache; Immigration and Naturalization Service, LEE HENRY OSWALD P-." (P- was an OSWALD Embassy file - P8593). Copies were sent to (deleted).

The HSCA: "The Agency maintained that prior to the assassination, its field sources [the Tarasoffs] had not actually linked OSWALD to the person who visited the Cuban Consulate in October 1963. Testimony obtained directly from these sources, however, established that this connection had in fact been made in early October 1963, [CIA Station, Mexico City] however, was not informed about OSWALD'S visa request, nor of his visits to the Cuban Consulate."

In PHILLIPS' autobiography, Nightwatch, he wrote that the CIA was aware of OSWALD'S request for a Soviet visa: "The circumstances were such, LEE HARVEY OSWALD wished to return to the Soviet Union via Cuba, that a cable to Headquarters asking for a Washington file check was in order." In his deposition during HUNT v. ajweberman, PHILLIPS stated, "We became aware in the CIA office about his visit to the Cuban Embassy some -- almost immediately after the assassination occurred. It was because information concerning that visit was in the system, and was retrieved almost immediately."

PHILLIP'S had two different stories about when the CIA first became aware OSWALD want a Soviet visa. PHILLIP'S made certain that the investigation of OSWALD by the CIA in Mexico City was deliberately slowed down by sitting on the information about the call wherein the name OSWALD was mentioned, then he blamed it on "Craig's wife." The translators told the HSCA that they knew that the man who was discussed over the Cuban and Soviet telephone line was the same man who called the Soviet Embassy in regard to an unspecified request, using the name OSWALD. The translators put two and two together, but that was as far as it went. Their information was suppressed by PHILLIPS, and some of their transcripts were destroyed.

The CIA had an elaborate system of surveillance focused on the Cuban Consulate. Why didn't OSWALD turn up on CIA photographic surveillance of the Cuban Consulate, which was located in the same building as the Cuban Embassy? OSWALD had gone to there three times.

OSWALD visited the Cuban Consulate on Friday, September 27, 1963. OSWALD came to Mexico City on the last day the CIA's cameras were down. Former CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner told the HSCA: "There was no pulse camera opposite the entrance to the Cuban Consulate until December 1963. Your investigators have seen the documentation recording this fact. In fact, there had been no photographic coverage of the Consulate entrance prior to the visit of LEE HARVEY OSWALD to Mexico City. The documentation for this statement has been made available to investigators. The Cuban Consulate entrance had been closed for some time [as the result of a CIA stench device operation in 1961] and after it was reopened, Friday, September 27, 1963, was scheduled as the day for installation of photographic equipment for its coverage. Difficulty was encountered in it's installation, and technicians had to machine a part for the equipment. Your investigators have seen the documentation on which these statements are based. The technicians probably had to return to their shop to make the part in question. On that date, or at some date not long afterwards, there was test photography of the entrance; that photography has been reviewed by your investigators. They also have seen documentation stating the photographic coverage of the Consulate did not commence until some time in October. Various difficulties were experience with the equipment, which seems to have been resolved by installation of the pulse camera in December 1963."

A CIA report indicated that the coverage was not perfected until mid-November 1963. "During the first two weeks of operation, the VLS-2 would trigger traffic entering and leaving the target entrance. Concerned with the necessity of reloading the camera twice daily, (Deleted) devised a system whereby the VLS-2 would only photograph people leaving, but not entering the target building. (Deleted)'s system works about 80% of the time, cutting film consumption considerably...The Robot Star camera which was given to (deleted) with the VLS-2 broke down after four days of photographing. (Deleted) replaced this with another Robot. Five days later, the second camera failed to advance properly. In both cases the spring would not advance the film for more than 15 exposures at a full winding...It is requested that a substitute camera be shipped to the Station as soon as possible to replace the Robot Star camera on this project...Willard C. Curtis." [CIA FOIA 02815 11.7.63]

Another of these visits was on a Saturday, September 28, 1963, when the CIA had no coverage. A CIA document stated: "Note only visit we know he made was Cuban Embassy Saturday, September 28, 1963, on which Embassy was closed and we have not had coverage. (Deleted)" [CIA 59-23]

The CIA's cameras that were focused on the Cuban Embassy and Cuban Consulate were positioned in a vacant apartment across the street. The CIA: "The Cuban Embassy coverage had more sophisticated equipment, using an impulse camera which frequently developed mechanical difficulties. [This device was not installed until December 1963.] (Deleted) (I think) handled this film - pick up and delivery. (Deleted) screened the film inside the station."

A CIA document dated February 10, 1977 stated:

SOURCE: Notes made by Ann Goodpasture for John Leader, IG Staff

SUBJECT: Background on Mexico Station Support Assets

(Coverage of Soviet and Cuban Embassies)

1. (Deleted) Coverage:

From the time the Mexico Station was opened (deleted) arrival of Mr. Winston Scott, Chief of Station (deleted) (still in LA/HQ) had had developed a support apparatus to exploit leads from the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City. This umbrella type project (Deleted) consisted of (Deleted) three photographic sites, a mobile surveillance team, and a (Deleted) operation. (Deleted) Generally these were Mexican or Mexican-Americans recruited age agents who were related (which the Station at that time felt was good security in that if they talked shop, they would talk to each other.)

Three photographic sites were handled by a Station case officer, assisted by TSD technicians on TDY from Headquarters, who advised the stations on the best types of cameras, films, and concealment devices. The operations had sub-crypts under project (Deleted) namely (Deleted) and (Deleted) was a fixed site bang opposite the Soviet Embassy (across the street) which had both a vehicle and pedestrian entrance. The gate to the Soviet Embassy was on the northwest corner of the Soviet compound and the (Deleted)site was diagonally across double laned street on the southeast corner of that block. (See attached diagram). (Deleted) was the first photo base, and operated strictly on an experimental basis in the early stages. I think the Station bought this property (a one story Spanish Colonial stone house) through (Deleted) (check to be sure). Later, this house began to fall apart. This base, however, was closed when the Station received word that the photograph of the "unidentified man" was being released by the Warren Commission. The photo operators were moved to another apartment nearby. The property was sold (under an operational agreement with (Deleted) for a long term lease on the top floor of a new apartment building to be built on this site). (Deleted) was planned as an alternative photographic base. It was located in an upper apartment building on the same side of the street as the (Deleted) site but in the middle of the block south. It had a slanted view of the front gate of the Soviet Embassy. The agents in (Deleted) and (Deleted) and (Deleted) as far as we knew, were not acquainted with each other. (Deleted) was a rented apartment. (Deleted) the third photographic site, was located in one of a row of four houses on the south side of the Soviet Embassy compound. The site overlooked the back garden of the Soviet Embassy compound. The purpose of this operation was to get good identification photographs of Soviet personnel (who at the time were largely unidentified in Mexico Station records). The three photographic sites were managed by a recruited agent who was a Mexican citizen, the son of an American mother, and Mexican father (deceased). This agent collected the film from the (Deleted) sites three times a week. The film was then developed and printed into 9 X 10 contact sheets contact print strips by his sister's husband. The master plan was for (Deleted) film to be processed inside Station, but TSD man from (Deleted) resigned, could not handle the volume, and as the unprocessed film began to accumulate, the inside CO (Deleted) became disgusted and took the film out for (Deleted's) brother-in-law to process probably early (deleted). This (Deleted) became the handler for all three photo bases. A sensitive (deleted) operation was run out of another of these houses (crypt for the four house was (deleted) etc). This was handled by (Deleted) (outside TSD officer) and (Deleted) using HQ TDY teams for (deleted). This operation was also separate from (deleted). The two houses in between were rented to unsuspecting tenants.

Mobile surveillance was conducted by two American staff officers. These two officers organized a surveillance team of six recruited agents which used late model cars and a panel truck for surveillance. The team could be activated by radio from the (Deleted) site whenever someone of interest left the gate of the Soviet Embassy. They would stay with them until they made their meetings. These agents were aware of the (Deleted) site since they had been issued (Deleted) photographs for identification purposes. This worked fairly well until about (deleted), when one of the surveillance agents got too close to his target and was arrested by Mexican transit police and turned over to the Mexican Secret Service. By the time the Station could arrange a cleared attorney and bail him out (deleted), the agent had identified (Deleted), who was evacuated (deleted) and the inside phone number of (Deleted) (who was subsequently replaced by (Deleted). As a result of this flap, the (deleted) project was broken up into several others. The agents were not changed, but given new crypts. (Deleted) and (Deleted) replaced (Deleted) and handled the surveillance team (Deleted) and the photo bases through (Pages Deleted).

The Station also conducted a (Deleted) operation, which was handled by an American case officer. (Deleted)

2. (Deleted) Coverage:

(Deleted)

3. OSWALD Coverage

The base house (Deleted) and a (Deleted) who made short summaries of conversations of interest which were then included in a daily resume to the Chief of Station which was received each day around 8:00 a.m. passed by (Deleted) to Goodpasture to get to Scott before 9:00 a.m. Later, when a reel was completely recorded full transcripts were typed and passed to the Station, however, there was usually a lag of a day or two. Reels which contained Russian or a language other than Spanish or English were taken to another location for translation and typing. (Deleted) did the Russian translation but because of the volume or Russian conversations, the translations usually ran about a week behind the date of the conversation. During this period (fall of 1963) the reels were probably being brought into the station and carried to (Deleted) by one of the people from the Soviet Section or they may have been carried to him by (Deleted) but I think I brought the reel in and gave it to (Deleted) to take to (Deleted). (Deleted) handled all the processing of Soviet transcripts. Goodpasture's job involved screening the photographs as soon as we learned that the man calling himself OSWALD was probably an American. However, here again, there was a backlog because the photographs were picked-up three times a week, but those picked up were usually for dates a few days before, since the technician who was processing the film did so on a night-time basis. Further, photographs were not made initially until a complete roll of film was used. Later, this was changed, and the operator cleared the camera each day. The instructions were to cover the entire work day (office hours 10:00 a.m. - 12:00 p.m. 2:00 p.m. - 4:00 p.m. weekdays) and to photograph all Soviets, their families, all foreigners, and cars with foreign license plates. Human error did occur, but generally the agents were conscientious. The Cuban Embassy coverage had more sophisticated equipment using a pulse camera which frequently developed mechanical difficulties. (Deleted) (I think) handled this film - pick up and delivery. (Deleted) screened the film inside the station.

OSWALD came to the attention of (deleted). It was picked-up and taken to (deleted) for translation because the caller was trying to speak in Russian. There was some delay, because Station personnel waited to compare the photographs with the typed transcript. All transcripts were made in either Spanish or English, since the Chief of Station could only read these two languages, and because he personally screened the transcripts for operational leads.

My memory is a little vague about the origins of the Cuban Embassy, but I think the staff first developed from a pro-Castro group celebrating on New Years eve 1959. As I recall, it was a makeshift arrangement of volunteers through most of 1960 and 1961 (Deleted).

Personnel assignments: Of interest to us now is who was in Mexico during the period prior to OSWALD'S visit, and the subsequent investigation by the Warren Commission. To determine who was there, and what they were doing, I have grouped persons together chronologically with areas of their assignment (Deleted) so that as the name pops up, one can tell what period they were in Mexico and what their assignments were at the time. (Deleted) COS Winston Scott (deceased) DCOS (Deleted) Covert Action (Deleted) Cuban Operations (Deleted) Soviet Target (Deleted) Soviet Transcribers (Deleted) Support Assets (Deleted) [This was a combination of two highly deleted documents].

The Cubans knew of this operation in 1963, but were powerless to do anything about it, since the project had Mexican Police approval. [CIA Cuba Accuses Havana 1978]

PHILLIPS stated: "I know there are a lot of stories about photographs of OSWALD taken in Mexico City. None were taken. The cameras were not working that day." In a deposition PHILLIPS repeated: "There were no photographs taken by the CIA of OSWALD, as far as I know, or by anybody else during his visit to Mexico."

OSWALD'S visits were all timed to insure this.

OSWALD visited the Soviet Embassy at least twice.

The CIA: "Of the photographic coverage of the entrance to the Soviet Embassy, the Agency has been able to locate the photography of only one of the two cameras involved. It is believed this is all that exists. The last picture taken by that one camera on Friday, September 27, 1963, was at 11:46 a.m. OSWALD did not appear in the day's photography, so it is safe to say he did not go there prior to that time. OSWALD returned to the Soviet Embassy on Saturday, another day that there was no coverage."

DAVID PHILLIPS said he had studied the photographs: "John and I spent several days studying literally hundreds of photographs available to the CIA before, and during, OSWALD'S trip to Mexico City." Asked about accusations that the pictures had been destroyed PHILLIPS answered, "Absolutely untrue. I was there and I know." On September 30, 1980, PHILLIPS was deposed in HUNT v. ajweberman:

Q. OSWALD had a conversation on October 1, 1963 with Soviet guard Ivan Obyedkov.

A. Counselor, since I retired from the CIA five years ago, I have been a professional writer. I have had three books published by major firms. Based on that experience I have the eerie sensation that these questions are aimed at producing some sort of manuscript, rather than court records. What possible reason is there in this case to ask me, a CIA agent who's already made it obvious that I am not going to violate my secrecy oath, to describe what happened at the Soviet Embassy?

Q. My concern is to establish truth as a defense to the libel action and the slander action.

A. Well, perhaps we can save a little time. I do want to make a general statement because, apparently, of what you are leading to. One, I am absolutely convinced that LEE HARVEY OSWALD had no connection with the CIA. If HOWARD HUNT ever met LEE HARVEY OSWALD, I certainly never knew about it. Judging from what I know about being in Mexico City at the time, during the time period we are talking about, both the Soviets and the Cubans thought that LEE HARVEY OSWALD was some sort of kook and sent him back to Dallas alone. And during that period -- right now, there's been so much about perhaps the CIA was behind the assassination. I would like to say to you, ah-ha. I would love to prove Castro was behind it or the Soviets. I can't. LEE HARVEY OSWALD to my knowledge had no connection with the CIA, no connection with HOWARD HUNT.

And finally, addressing another thing, a moment ago Mr. ajweberman mentioned a statement by Mr. Tad Szulc. Tad Szulc is a widely known journalist. He made a statement, I believe it was in the book about HOWARD HUNT, in which he said that HOWARD HUNT was Acting Chief of Station in Mexico City in the 1963 area. I am convinced that Mr. Szulc making that statement was in error.

Q. All right. Do you know whether or not Mr. OSWALD ever offered any information to the Soviets in exchange for a visa and whether or not he identified himself during the various calls by name or just said "It's me" expecting them to know who he was?

A. I'm aware of various things that had been printed in the newspapers, including the story printed about me which incorrectly said that I destroyed various matters and so forth. I'm aware of those stories. But I'm afraid we are right back to the business that I will get in the same kind of trouble that I have gotten into in the past if I try to go into facts any further.

There were no pictures of OSWALD, because PHILLIPS and HUNT had instructed him to enter the Soviet Embassy and Cuban Consulate when there was no photographic coverage.

A follow-up telex from CIA Headquarters advised the Mexico City CIA Station to pass the information on OSWALD to "Embassy personnel, and to its liaison with the Mexican Police," since there was no local dissemination of the OCTOBER 8, 1963, and OCTOBER 9, 1963, cables regarding OSWALD and Obyedkov. [CIA 7-2]

Neither this, nor the first telegram from Headquarters regarding OSWALD, contained any reference to the photograph of OSWALD requested by the Mexico City CIA Station. On October 15, 1963, CIA Station/Mexico City sent a telex to the DD/Plans: "Action Western Hemisphere 8 INFO: ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, CI/SP, FI, SR 7, RF, VR. Please Pouch Photo of OSWALD. Secret Chief of Station. Comment: Attempts Of LEE OSWALD And Wife To Reenter U.S." [CIA 8-4] CIA Station/Mexico City received no response. On October 24, 1963, the CIA cabled the Navy and requested a photograph of OSWALD:

"Routing (deleted). October 24, 1963. Origin: (deleted); Unit: Western Hemisphere /3/Mexico; Ext: 5940; Date: October 23, 1963; To: Department Of Navy; From: CIA; CONF: Western Hemisphere 8; INFO: CI, CI/OPS, SR 7, RF, VR...It is requested that you forward to this office as soon as possible two copies of the most recent photograph you have of Subject...CI/OPS/Western Hemisphere (deleted) (in draft); SR/CI/A (draft) Roll i); AC/Western Hemisphere /# (deleted); Jane Roman CI/Liaison; (deleted) Chief/Western Hemisphere/R Authenticating Officer."

On October 25, 1963, this highly deleted dispatch was sent: "Deleted" Please transmit the attached envelope to (deleted) only. (Deleted) Att sent DDP by (deleted) October 30 Attachment: Envelope Distribution 3 -(deleted) Chron 15027 Dispatch Symbol and Number (deleted) HQS File Number (deleted) Date October 25."

The CIA had OSWALD'S photograph in CIA file #593-252C, an article from the Washington Post dated November 16, 1959. When the CIA first released this article, the Xerox was done so that OSWALD'S picture was not visible. In November 1992 he became visible. William Stuckey obtained this article. [CIA 8-4] The CIA could have obtained a glossy photograph from The Washington Post. Because the CIA did not locate this article, OSWALD'S photograph was never sent to the Embassy, and it could not be compared to the surveillance photographs. The investigation of OSWALD by the Mexico City Station of the CIA was stalled. Had it received a photograph, it would have been obvious that of the men photographed entering the Embassy, none of them was OSWALD, and the investigation could have progressed. Did Jane Roman go to ANGLETON for this photograph?

The CIA claimed its transcriber mistakenly coupled the tapes of OSWALD with a photograph of a person who was not OSWALD. This researcher called him "X." The HSCA explained: "The committee had other reports that the CIA had obtained a picture of OSWALD that was taken during one of his visits to the Soviet and the Cuban Embassies. The CIA, however, denied that such a photograph had been obtained, and no pictures of OSWALD were discovered by the committee during its review of Agency files...The committee was unable to determine whether the CIA did in fact come into possession of a photograph of OSWALD taken during his visits to the Soviet and Cuban Embassies in Mexico City. The overwhelming weight of the evidence indicated that the initial conclusion of the Agency employees that the individual in the photograph was OSWALD, was the result of a careless mistake." [HSCA R p249]

X was photographed entering Soviet Embassy on October 1, 1963, [OSWALD called the Embassy on October 1, 1963] and October 4, 1963. X was photographed entering the Cuban Embassy on October 15, 1963. [CIA 83-30, 621-259, 935-927G, 876-897, 881-901, 935-927-G] OSWALD left Mexico City on October 2, 1963. The CIA later reported: "In its original October 9, 1963 report, Mexico City had said it had a photograph of an apparent American male leaving the Soviet Embassy on October 1, 1963, the day OSWALD phoned there. (Deleted.) Accordingly, we cabled the Navy Department on October 24, 1963, asking for a photograph of OSWALD from his Marine Corps days so we could compare photographs. We had not received this photograph by November 22, 1963, but in any event, it turned out the man photographed outside the Embassy was not OSWALD. As chance would have it, none of our (deleted) in Mexico City had ever taken an identifiable picture of LEE OSWALD."

On November 22, 1963, Winston Scott forwarded X's picture to CIA Headquarters. Ambassador Thomas Mann had a member of the Office of the Legal Attache fly to Dallas with another picture of X. [CIA 29-12] After Winston Scott had seen OSWALD on television that night, and he cabled CIA Headquarters and informed them X was not OSWALD. The FBI realized this; nonetheless, S.A. Bardwell Odum showed the photograph to Marguerite Oswald on November 23, 1963. When JACK RUBY assassinated OSWALD the next day, OSWALD'S distraught mother thought JACK RUBY was X. [CIA 20; CIA 31-7] Bardwell Odum related, "I showed her the picture on November 23, the next day RUBY shot OSWALD. She thought I had showed her a photograph of RUBY."

Next, X was suspected of being A. J. Hidell, the fictitious president of the nonexistent New Orleans Chapter of the Fair Play for Cuba Committee. Finally, the CIA decided that X might be an assassin, and notified the United States Secret Service. [CIA 1640-449] In 1967 CIA Counsel General Lawrence Houston [died 8.17.95] wrote a letter to a judge in New Orleans explaining that, because of the investigation of New Orleans District Attorney Jim Garrison, the CIA had checked its files for a photograph of OSWALD in Mexico City. All it found was that X, "to our knowledge, has not been identified." The Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, William Colby, told Dan Rather in 1975: "To this day we still do not know who he is." [CIA 942-927N, 952-927X, 943-9270, 953-927Y, 408] In 1993 the CIA finally released seven out of nine uncropped photographs of X. A cover document stated: "There are eight photographs in this envelope. NB: This is a selection of photographs available of this unidentified individual." The CIA had a selection of photographs of this unknown man, yet none of OSWALD.

X was the Subject of a book published in 1975 and reprinted in 1992, Appointment in Dallas, by Hugh C. McDonald. Hugh C. McDonald claimed that retired CIA agent Herman Kimsey told him X was a professional hit man named "Saul." Herman Kimsey was a former Army Intelligence Officer. He explained in his resume: "From 1946 to 1953 my duties consisted of investigating crimes of a security nature; I was a member of a combat CIC team in Korea; Technical Laboratory Chief at the CIC Center and Technical Laboratory, and Chief of the CIC Far East Command." Herman Kimsey was an Agency staff employee from March 1953 to July 1962. He was Chief of the CIA Research and Analysis, Graphic Aids Reproduction Branch, Technical Services Division, for eight years. On April 20, 1961, Herman Kimsey received Top Secret approval. On May 22, 1961, Herman Kimsey received $380,000 from Sheffield Edwards. Herman Kimsey examined the currency and determined it was sterile. In January 1962, the CIA presented Herman Kimsey with one of the largest individual Monetary Suggestion Awards ever given by that Agency. In March 1963, Herman Kimsey was doing business under the name Security Associates Incorporated, and by 1964 he was in partnership with Hugh C. McDonald.

On August 10, 1970, a memo was drafted titled "Herman E. Kimsey, Shenanigans CI/TRCO/GT, Stanton, C/CI/R&A, Mr. Donovan E. Pratt, Mr. Edward Katiski" stating "(Deleted) of Technical Services Division that Kimsey of BEVISION [Goleniewski] fame, a former Technical Services Division-nick tried to get her to analyze the handwriting of some homosexuals who were 'the real murderers of Martin Luther King.' Kimsey gives out that he is working to exonerate Ray for this peccadillo."

Herman Kimsey was the Associate Chief of International Intelligence for the Shickshinny Sovereign Military Order of Knights of Malta. The Knights of Malta were an offshoot of the Knights of St. John, who, like the Teutonic Knights, fought in the Crusades. The Knights of Malta became an ultra-conservative international group granted sovereignty by the Vatican. On December 27, 1946, ANGLETON received the Knights of Malta's Croci Al Merito Seconda Classe, the same day as Raymond Rocca. In the late 1960's, Herman Kimsey championed Goleniewski's claim to be the last of the Romanovs, and therefore the Czar. Herman Kimsey died from heart failure at age 55, on January 24, 1971. [Russell The Man Who Knew Too Much p798; FBI62-109060-7504; NY Review of Books 4.3.75 - Saul and Fensterwald; Covert Action Number 25 Winter 1986; Wash. Star 11.1.67; Gambino Memo re; McD 8.3.76; JG Brown Memo re: Kimsey 12.2.75; Kimsey Memo re: $ 4.12.61; Kimsey Resume]

Herman Kimsey declared if Hugh C. McDonald told the story, he would deny it and his associate, Leonard Davidov, would have his notes and papers, if anything happened to him. The story in abbreviated form: "Saul" had been in Guatemala training for the Bay of Pigs with the Cuban Revolutionary Council, when the CIA hired him to kill President John F. Kennedy. Hugh C. McDonald tracked him down, at great personal risk, and obtained his confession. Hugh C. McDonald added the following "facts" to our knowledge of covert operations: Adlai Stevenson was killed by an air-propelled needle capsule; the suicide of Navy Secretary James Forrestal was instigated by the Russians through subliminal audio suggestion; the London and Hong Kong flues were caused by missiles in the jet stream filled with Russian viral "time release capsules," and William [sic] Bremer was hired by an Algerian terrorist group to shoot Governor Wallace. [McDonald, H. Appt. In Dallas Zebra 1975 NYC]

FBI Director Clarence Kelley ordered an in-depth study of this book by S.A. Gemberling. Robert Gemberling: "I remember making the review, and I recall he even had a copy of his National Academy Graduation Certificate, showing that he had attended the National Academy, which would indicate he was considered to be a pretty good law enforcement officer. But in reading the book one thing sticks out; when I came to Dallas in 1956 you couldn't buy a drink over the bar, you could only buy a drink in private clubs, and he talked about this guy named Saul who supposedly stayed in a hotel down near the assassination site. Saul went down to the hotel dining room in the evening and he ordered a vodka drink with his dinner. There was no private club in the hotel." The FBI reported: "Herman Kimsey was shown in various files as being (deleted). In 1965 he is shown as a former CIA employee associated with a Cleve Backster in the Academy of Scientific Interrogation, New York City, a polygraph operators firm." Cleve Backster was associated with Christopher Bird and was a co-author of The Secret Life of Plants, which alleged that plants could think. Herman Kimsey was involved with the Forensic Science Institute, which investigators for Congressmen Wright Patman (Dem.-TX.) determined was a Washington, D.C., hotel room. The FBI concluded: "Statements of thoughts and opinions of McDonald without any real facts to back such statements certainly raise questions as to the veracity of the text of this book...it would appear that McDonald obtained the character Troit mentioned in this book by having read about DeMohrenschildt...General Investigative Division recommends that no investigative attention be directed to McDonald's allegations. McDonald is a 62 year old retired investigator, who had a most adventurous career, and who, in retirement, is endeavoring to achieve additional recognition and financial gain."

The CIA's Office of Security examined this book: "Office of Security records do not support Mr. McDonald's claims to CIA employment, or involvement in clandestine operations. From 1955 to circa 1961 McDonald, as an independent contractor, assisted Technical Services Division, Authentication Division, DDP, in the development of Identikit. During the period of his contractual relationship, McDonald was a Senior Official in the Los Angeles County Sheriff's Office [he left in 1967] and by May 1969, had formed World Associates, Inc. Santa Monica, California. In June 1969 Central Cover Staff evidenced interest in McDonald under Project (deleted). Commencing in January 1970, Mr. McDonald initiated meetings with the Domestic Contacts Division, suggesting that his firm, soon to be involved internationally in bank security, could be used for intelligence procurement. The Office of Security files do not reflect the outcome of the Domestic Contacts Division and CCS interests."

PHILLIPS: "None of the CIA Mexico City personnel knew anything about LEE HARVEY OSWALD." There was, however, someone at the Embassy who did. D.E. Boster was stationed at the American Embassy, Mexico City, in October 1963. Boster became a political officer there in September 1962. In June 1993 D.E. Boster stated, "PHILLIPS was in the Embassy in Mexico City when I was there. We knew each other, but we didn't know each other well. I was in the Foreign Service, not the CIA. I don't know who PHILLIPS consulted about OSWALD. I mean, I was never consulted. I was never aware of any..." PHILLIPS refused to answer any questions regarding D.E. Boster. The CIA Station, Mexico City, eventually received a photograph of OSWALD from the U.S. Navy after the events of November 22, 1963.

FBI Legal Attache Clark Anderson worked in the American Embassy, Mexico City, at the time HUNT worked there. Clark Anderson told this researcher he was assigned to Mexico City from 1948 through 1958 and "during that period of time I have no recollection of HUNT. It wouldn't be unusual. They had their operation, we had ours. I did know DAVID PHILLIPS." PHILLIPS described Clark Anderson as "the senior FBI station man in Mexico...the CIA and FBI in Mexico worked together over many years." Clark Anderson conducted the investigation of OSWALD'S activities in Mexico City for the Warren Commission. He wanted J. Edgar Hoover to send him three agents who would help him bring the Kennedy investigation matter to its "logical end" - two veterans of the Mexico City Field Office, and Dallas FBI S.A. Wallace Heitman. Clark Anderson believed "there was more to this matter than simply a 'nut' shooting the President." [FBI DL 89-43-103] J. Edgar Hoover never sent these particular agents, although Wallace Heitman did conduct 12 interviews concerning the assassination of President John F. Kennedy. The CIA withheld a document that "discusses a possible temporary assignment of an additional FBI officer on a specific assignment." PHILLIPS, and an associate he called "John," helped Clark Anderson conduct his investigation of OSWALD'S activities in Mexico City. During HUNT v. ajweberman PHILLIPS was asked:

Q. Clark Anderson was the FBI investigator down in the Mexico City area after November 1963. Were you aware of his investigation in Mexico City?

A. I was aware that Mr. Clark Anderson was chief of the FBI. He was not an investigator. He was the senior FBI station in Mexico.

Q. Did he ever request any assistance of you on working on the investigation in that area at that time?

A. The CIA and FBI in Mexico worked together over many, many years.

The FBI consulted with PHILLIPS who described the CIA's surveillance operation as a "plant." [Legat Mexico City 105-3702 3.6.64 - NARA FBI 124-10162-10023]

During a telephone conversation in 1993 with this researcher Thomas Mann stated: "I never saw the CIA's incoming and outgoing messages, and I don't even know what - who killed Winston Scott or why? He died in his own backyard. It was a very mysterious death." Dick Russell reported: "It was on a late weekend night, and, the way family members recall it, Scott had gone outside alone and climbed up the gangplank to get a better look at a new brick wall that was being built in his backyard. His tumble into the rose bushes seemed more embarrassing to him than anything else. He went to bed, awoke in some pain with bruises and cuts, then experienced trouble breathing at breakfast. He was taken to the hospital where a doctor found nothing seriously wrong and sent him home. On April 26, 1971, as he was preparing to go to his office, his wife, Janet, found Scott slumped over a chair at his breakfast table. No autopsy was performed, and a postmortem suggested he had apparently suffered a blood clot to his heart during the fall." [Russell, Man Who Knew Too Much p460]

ANGLETON flew to Mexico City to attend the funeral of Winston Scott. According to the family of Winston Scott, ANGLETON was interested obtaining all of Winston Scott's papers. Scott Breckinridge wrote:

MEMO FOR FILE

SUBJECT: Win Scott MSS

1. Ben Evans spoke with Colonel White (White phoned him) yesterday. After finishing their discussion Ben asked White what he recalled about Scott's diary/mss.

2. White says that Readers Digest had a copy, which led to our interest. Mr. ANGLETON went to Mexico City and got the manuscript. It was a lousy thing, filled with Scott's sex life and operations, and someone 'deep-sixed' it. I didn't get out of this whether that meant it was destroyed, although it seems this is what happened. Ben spoke with George Lauder (DC/LA) who confirmed this outline. Ben felt that someone had been doing work on it, and he told Lauder of my interest. SDB

Raymond M. Reardon located the manuscript in the possession of the CI Staff: "Since the CI Staff is the office of record in regard to the Kennedy assassination material, they are in the best position to comment on the factual errors in Mr. Scott's account of OSWALD'S activities in Mexico City." Reardon was afraid that Readers Digest had obtained a copy of the manuscript through Scott's friend, John Barron, and was going to publish it. [NARA 1993.07.21.17:02:09:060280]

Winston Scott's manuscript differed from the CIA's version of events. Winston Scott wrote:

"I learned something of LEE HARVEY OSWALD in the period from Friday, September 27, 1963, when LEE HARVEY OSWALD, having just arrived in Mexico City, made his first contact with the Soviet Embassy in Mexico. He said that he wanted to go to the Crimea. In fact, LEE HARVEY OSWALD became a person of great interest to us during his September 27, 1963, to October 1, 1963, period. He contacted the Soviet Embassy on at least four occasions and one once went directly from the office of Sylvia Duran.

"Because we thought at first that LEE HARVEY OSWALD might be a dangerous potential defector from the U.S.A. to the Soviet Union, he was of great interest to us, so we kept a special watch on him and his activities. He was observed on all his visits to each of the two communist embassies, and his conversations with personnel of these embassies were studied in detail, so far as we knew them. OSWALD told a high-ranking officer of the Soviet Embassy that that officer should have had word from the Soviet Embassy in Washington about his visit and its purpose, after he had spelled out his full name, slowly and carefully, for this Soviet. He gave them his name very slowly and carefully and saying the Soviet Embassy in Mexico should have received word from the Soviet Embassy in Washington that he (OSWALD) would contact them about a visa for himself, his wife, who he said was a Soviet citizen and their child....He further told this Soviet that he should know that OSWALD, his wife and child wanted to go to the Crimea urgently and he (OSWALD) had learned that he would have to go by way of Cuba. OSWALD was then directed to the Cuban Embassy by the Soviet, who told OSWALD he would need a Cuban transit visa. These visits are no hearsay; for persons watching these embassies photographed OSWALD as he entered and left each one; and clocked the time he spent on each visit. The conversations are also known to have taken place, including the one in which he told the Soviet to whom he was talking that he should have heard, received a message, from the Soviet Embassy in Washington indicating obviously that a Soviet Embassy official in Washington had offered to help OSWALD...OSWALD'S visits at both the Communist Cuban Embassy and the Soviet Embassy in Mexico City are, together with what is known of what took place during these visits, sufficient to make him a suspect agent, acting on behalf of the Soviets, in several things, including the assassination of Kennedy. When one studies the conversations OSWALD is known to have had with officials of both these communist embassies, it is evident that there are sufficient data for this suspicion..." [Leader IG Staff to Reardon OS 12.21.70; NARA 1993.07.21.19:54:08:930590]

ANGLETON knew that OSWALD had been instructed by PHILLIPS and HUNT in regard to CIA surveillance, and how to avoid it, and that OSWALD did not show up on the CIA's cameras. ANGLETON knew that Scott was lying. Dick Russell believed Winston Scott possessed tapes of the Cuban Consulate and Soviet Embassy telephone taps during the period OSWALD telephoned. The CIA CI Staff commented: "OSWALD identified himself only as LEE OSWALD and did not spell out his name. NB: (deleted)." Scott said that OSWALD wanted to go to the Crimea. This referred to the Odessa phone call that the CIA said was not linked to OSWALD. SCOTT was about to double-cross ANGLETON when he suddenly died.

Willard Curtis died in April 1971. His widow discussed his death with the CIA Station in Mexico City: "(2 - Deleted) turned to planned Curtis trip to see Director of which she aware and covered chief parts of manuscript of which she aware but which she said she had not seen. She told (4 - Deleted) on April 29, 1971, that she and others have heard much talk of manuscript from Curtis. For example, Burnell Goodrich claims to have read one chapter. She thinks (Deleted) may have helped with (5 - Deleted) parts. This discussion of manuscript by Curtis, although not clear who all may have read it, means it is well known and, according to her, looked for with some anticipation by friends in his U.S. circle here. (2 - Deleted) advised her against reading manuscript, as it discusses in open way intimate matters of previous marriage. Importantly ( 2 - Deleted) pointed out, information therein would violate two different secrecy agreements (Deleted and U.S.) as well as doing great damage to our relationships with other governments. The information is, as it were, U.S. Government property and (2 - Deleted) said that the publication would dismay Curtis' friends and harm his reputation and memory. She seemed appalled at the idea of publishing manuscript, saying that she realized when Curtis told her of visit to Director that something was wrong. She also asked (2 - Deleted) about Curtis' motivation in this. In discussion of these and other papers she agreed (although it then seemed to (4 - Deleted) somewhat hesitant) to cooperate with (4- Deleted) on getting Agency papers from Curtis' belongings. (2 - Deleted) will remember Barron statement late night of April 28, 1971, that he would forget the manuscript, taking no steps to go forward with publication...With her efficient cooperation (4 - Deleted) spent several hours going through safes and cabinets and valises in study, and loaded three large cartons and four valises with file folders and notes and memoranda of classified Station files. Also, when she and brothers at Curtis office the previous day, they had pulled out, under lawyer's eyes, number of documents which obviously classified or Agency oriented (Curtis name in pseudonym, Secret stamps and so on.)...While we shall inventory later, to at least cursory extent, importantly we got two original drafts (apparently the second and rewrite) and two carbons of manuscript. Plus there were a number of drafts, some repetitive of what appears to have been the final manuscript. She knows of no other copies extant, save what Barron may have. She says manuscript typed in final in English by woman in Mexico unknown to her, and we will trace this. Not sure we have all classified papers, and think she and lawyer will cooperate in turning over other finds. There is one locked box in safe which, when she has key, she promised to open with (4 - Deleted). We suspect this may contain missing tapes on (Deleted) case and 'Lesbians" which Barron spoke of to (2 - Deleted). (We have found Huey Newton and Cleaver tapes but these only tapes so far.)...Manuscript. It appears to (4 - Deleted) that she not even wistful about it at this point, and when she commented that Curtis must have had money in mind it apparent that she did not want money that badly (although clear she quite uncertain about her financial status or future.) (4 - Deleted) warned her that Curtis friends may feel Agency has pulled a fast one with manuscript but that (4 - Deleted) prepared to weather that one...On April 30, 1971, Mrs. Curtis turned over further classified papers to (Deleted) along with a small arsenal of weapons..." [CIA 300115Z April 1971 Cit (Deleted) 16466]

After November 22, 1963, at the request of United States Ambassador Thomas Mann, the Mexican CIA Station cabled Headquarters: "Paragraph 3. Mexi suggesting to (deleted) that Sylvia Duran...who put OSWALD on telephone from Cuban Embassy to talk to Soviet Embassy on September 28, 1963, be arrested immediately by Mexican authorities and held incommunicado until she gives all details on OSWALD known to her." [CIA 56-20] This request was sent to Luis Echevarria, though his private secretary (Accacer) on November 23, 1963. Copies were put in OSWALD's file at the Mexican Embassy P - 8593, in Duran's file and in Deleted's file. [CIA 64-552] In another document Mann suggested "we should immediately request Mexicans to arrest Sylvia Duran so as to eliminate possibility of her being smuggled out of Mexico or killed here. This should be done immediately and irrespective of whether Washington decides to authorize us to act along lines of other foregoing recommendations." [CIA 128-590]

Thomas Mann was contacted in June 1993. He stated: "I don't know anything about that message. The Embassy had over a thousand people, and the CIA and the FBI had their own people. I never heard tapes of OSWALD nor did I see any transcriptions. I'm 80 years old."

When Assistant Deputy Director / Plans, Thomas Karamessines, discovered the arrest of Sylvia Duran was imminent, he contacted Mexico City and told the Kubarkers to cancel it:

Memo for the Record:

After receipt of (deleted) at about 5:15 p.m. on November 23, 1963, saying that (Deleted) arrest Sylvia Duran, Mr. Karamessines ADDP, ordered us to phone (deleted) and tell them not to do it. We phoned as ordered, against my wishes...(Deleted) answered and said it was too late to call off the arrest. He emphasized that the Mexicans had known of the OSWALD involvement with Sylvia Duran (Deleted). He agreed with our request that the arrest be kept secret and that no information be leaked." [CIA 36-540] The unnamed CIA agent Thomas Karamessines spoke with recalled: "I told him it was too late, I could not reverse the request."

The Agent indicated: "Note: At 4:20 p.m. on November 23, 1963, [written with Roman numerals] I had a call from (deleted) (Washington) asking that I not do paragraph 3. I told him it was too late, I cannot rescind request. I told him, in what I hope was secure language, that he already should have received a cable in which I told them that (President) here had knowledge which made this action (against Duran) so that it could be Mexican initiative. He said 'O.K.'. (Deleted.) Note: I had return call from Echevarria (at about 3:15 p.m. on November 23, 1963) saying they wanted to get 'Major' (?) and he would immediately notify me. (Deleted) He thanked me for info on her. (Deleted)" [CIA 56-20] Another CIA note regarding the arrest of Duran had this note on it in Egerter's handwriting "Echevarria said she was arrested with seven others including her husband. They were having a fiesta and Echevarria had just had a meeting with the President (Who apparently said 'Proceed' and interrogate forcefully)." [CIA 3-526]

Thomas Karamessines released a FLASH cable that read:

ORIGIN: Scelso

UNIT: C/WESTERN HEMISPHERE 3

EXT: 5613

DATE: NOVEMBER 23, 1963

TO: MEXICO CITY

FROM: DIRECTOR

CONF: WESTERN HEMISPHERE 8

INFO: DCI, D/DCI, DDP, ADDP, CI, CI/OPS, FI, SR7, Special Activities Staff 8, Office of Security 2, VR

To: FLASH MEXI

1. Arrest of Sylvia Duran is extremely serious matter that could prejudice ODYOKE [United States] freedom of action on entire question of PBRUMEN [Cuban] responsibility. With full regard for Mexican interests, request you insure her arrest is kept absolutely secret, that no information from her is published or leaked, that all such information is cabled to us, and that the fact of her arrest and her statements are not spread to leftist or disloyal Mexican Government circles.

2. We are trying to get more info on OSWALD from ODENVY and will advise directly through ODENVY Mexi.

Thomas H. Karamessines SCELSO C/WH 3

ADDP RELEASING OFFICER Authenticating Officer [CIA 37-529; NARA JFK 10015-10118]

. Note: The definition of ODYOKE as "the United States" and PBRUMEN as "Cuban" came from earlier versions of this document in which these words were substituted for the digraphs which appeared in the 1995 release.

John Scelso or Thomas Karamessines believed that if the Mexican Police tortured Sylvia Duran, the CIA - rather than Cuba - might have to take the blame for the Kennedy assassination. What could Sylvia Duran have known the would have hurt the right and benefited the left? When questioned by the SSCIA about this, on this author's suggestion, Thomas Karamessines "could not recall preparing the cable or his reasons for issuing such a message." [CIA 37-529-11.23.63; SSCIA Hearings-V5 p25] President Echevarria promised to keep the arrest secret. [CIA 70-557]

Richard Helms sent this cable to the Mexico City CIA Station: "For you private information, there distinct feeling here in all three agencies at Ambassador is pushing this case too hard (see paragraph 5 of (Deleted) and that we could well create flap with Cubans which could have serious repercussions Understand from Mr. Johnson that he sent State Channels telegram to Ambassador this afternoon attempting to give him better perspective on this whole problem. We hope this will be some assistance in reducing his pressures on you." [CIA 8546 11.27.63, Class. Message] Thomas C. Mann wanted the Mexican Police to inform Sylvia Duran, "her only chance for survival is to come clean with the whole story...in return for Mexican Government protection." [CIA 128590] Thomas C. Mann had been Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs during the early stages of Bay of Pigs. He pondered the legality of the invasion, finally concluding it was justified because Cuba was a Soviet satellite. The State Department suggested that the Mexican Government delete the results of the Sylvia Duran interrogation from the documents it was turning over to the Warren Commission. The Mexicans went along, but eventually published the document. [CIA 559-243; Duran interview rel. by DOJ-12.3.63; WCE 2567; DOS Outgoing Telegram 94914 7.2.64 serial 0224; Outgoing DOS Tele. Deptel, 7.23.64; DOS Memo of Con. 8.5.64 Boonstra/Gorostiza serial 0230]

On November 23, 1963, the Mexican Police followed Sylvia Duran until she stopped at the home of her brother-in-law. They then arrested everyone there, including Barbara Ann Bliss, who had lived in pre-Castro Cuba for many years. Barbara Ann Bliss declared that her father, Alonzo Bliss, owned numerous Cuban sugar plantations before the revolution. Now, she lived "on $800 a month from a Washington company that administered the estate of her father" although her rent was $1,200. She admitted to the Mexican Police that "she maintains a correspondence with a Cuban who sends her information which she passes to her father." Charles Bentley was arrested. He told the police that "He is in the process of getting a job as salesman with the Sonora Cattle Company, and that he has worked in Minneapolis as an assistant business manager. From 1954 through 1957 he served in the U.S. Marine Corps." Ruben Duran Navarro, a native of Los Angeles, was arrested. Ruben was married to Betty Serratos; he was 38 years old, and was in the process of obtaining his Mexican citizenship. Betty Serratos De Duran was a Honduran who had been residing in Mexico for ten years. She had the status of "familiar" immigrant, was 33 years old, and had taken a secretarial course in Kentucky.

On November 27, 1963, Sylvia Duran was rearrested because she was expected to leave Mexico for Cuba. The CIA reported: "Second pickup which was made on Government of Mexico initiative, without prior consultation with Station or (deleted) obviously evidence great desire Mexican authorities to be of service." [CIA 195-627] Richard Helms ordered the Mexico City Station to "insure that neither Sylvia Duran, nor Cubans, get the impression that Americans are behind rearrest. We want Mexican authorities to take responsibility for whole affair." This time, the Mexican Police questioned her about her ability to facilitate travel to Cuba. She claimed she had no such ability, since she "lacked contact with Cuba." [CIA 189-623, 177-618] The CIA prepared a set of questions for Sylvia Duran.

Sylvia Duran was told that this researcher believed that she was starting employment with the CIA around the time OSWALD visited her in the Cuban Consulate in Mexico City. She was questioned about why the CIA reacted as it did to her arrest. Sylvia Duran: "That is something I do not know. The CIA can think whatever they want. This is the first time I hear that. I mean I hear a lot of nonsense, but this is the most...I mean it is completely. I was not arrested. I was holded to answer some questions. They told me it was not an arrest. Afterwards, the Cuban Government protested, I guess you could call it my arrest, and I was questioned again. I stopped working at the Cuban Consulate because my government tell me I need permission. I didn't want to apply, so I stopped work there."

PHILLIPS was asked why the CIA was concerned about the arrests of Sylvia Duran. He refused to answer: "I would like to say that with this last question, you have come to a new part of this thing. Before there were these questions that bothered me so much. Now you are asking me to analyze CIA traffic written by other people." He was asked to comment on these names: "Maria Carmen, Olavarri, Maria Teresa Proenza, Barbara Ann Bliss or Horacio Duran?" He responded: "Counselor, I am not going to comment on the list of names and groups."

On November 22, 1963, CI/SIG Staffer Birch D. O'Neal cabled the Mexico City CIA Station to find out what it had on OSWALD: "Important you review all (deleted) since September 27, 1963, to locate all material possibly pertinent to Subject ref. Dispatch soonest by special courier, staffer if necessary, (deleted) all pertinent material." [CIA 40-541] According to author Paul Hoch: "On the day of the assassination, an FBI agent from the Washington Field Office [S.A. Courtland J. Jones] interviewed Birch O'Neal for the purpose of obtaining 'any information' in the CIA files on OSWALD." [Hoch Con. Dallas & Beyond p478] Birch O'Neal replied the only documents CIA possessed were those originating with the FBI and the State Department.

This was untrue. There was cable traffic from Mexico City. In July 1993 Birch D. O'Neal stated: "I've been contacted by many people who write books. I took an obligation to my government with regard to information that I had years ago. I was a close contact, I worked with JAMES ANGLETON, and I refuse to take any position about what anybody writes about him in this day and age. And I feel that anyone that was engaged in these activities during the war, or any other time, has a obligation to do the same. I can't even talk about it to my fellow employees. I have an obligation to other people that have real interests. I could die and go to hell before I will talk to anybody about it. I just don't feel anything is to be gained in our society by talking about these things and there's nothing in world wrong with JIM ANGLETON. He lived just like you do and I do." Edward Petty was asked about Birch O'Neal: "He was, in essence, the beginning of CI/SIG. He's the fellow that keeps all the secrets." In January 1964 the FBI requested that Birch O'Neal determine whether any of the listed names, addresses or telephone numbers linked to OSWALD were connected to Soviet intelligence. Birch O'Neal assigned the task to Bruce Solie of the CIA's Office of Security. Bruce Solie was an associate of ANGLETON and William Branigan. [CIA 506-213] Bruce Solie's normal job was to investigate the evidence against suspected moles as speedily as possible.

END OF NODULE.