OSWALD believed that ANGLETON had dispatched him on an official CIA mission. OSWALD'S early belief that he had a connection to the CIA was hinted at by the absence of the words "CIA" or "Central Intelligence Agency" in any of his writings, letters or speeches until the Summer of 1963. OSWALD was pro-Soviet, yet he never mentioned the Communists favorite whipping boy, the CIA? He was over-acting in order to disassociate himself from it. Marina Oswald was asked by the HSCA if her husband ever mentioned the word CIA. She responded: "Not that I recall. I never knew what the CIA was until they started asking me the questions. Until I came to this country I never knew what the CIA was. " [HSCA V12 p381. 366] In reality, OSWALD was not carried on the CIA's books. There was no document that indicated he worked for the CIA in the CIA's files. ANGLETON used OSWALD because OSWALD filled a vacuum.

Frontline reporter Scott Malone: "The CIA's Soviet Bloc Division sent spies into the Soviet Union but did not run any type of dispatched defector program in 1959."

The HSCA attempted to determine if OSWALD'S trip to the Soviet Union was part of a CIA operation: "To investigate this matter further, the committee interviewed the persons who had been chiefs or deputy chiefs during 1959 to 1962 of the units within the Soviet Russia Division that were responsible for Clandestine Activities and the American Visitors Program. The heads of the Clandestine Activity Section stated that during this period the CIA had few operatives in the Soviet Union and OSWALD was not one of them. Moreover, they added that - because of what they perceived to be his obvious instability - OSWALD would never have met the Agency's standards for use in the field. The heads of the Visitors Section of the Soviet Russia Division informed the committee that they met with each person involved in their program - and OSWALD was not one of them. These officials also advised the committee that clean-cut collegiate types tended to be used in this program, and that OSWALD did not meet this criterion."

In 1964, the former Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, Allen Dulles, did not consider this "instability factor" a valid line of reasoning: "Mr. Dulles did not think it would be a good idea to cite CIA procedures for agent assessment and handling to show that it would have been unlikely for OSWALD to have been chosen as a CIA agent to enter Russia. There are always exceptions to every rule and this might be misunderstood by the members of the Warren Commission." [HSCA V4 p233]

OSWALD was an ANGLETON operation, and the chiefs of other CIA components concerned with the U.S.S.R. had not the slightest knowledge of his connection to JAMES ANGLETON. They told the truth to the HSCA. ANGLETON and his associates did not reveal their connection to OSWALD to the HSCA. The HSCA was therefore convinced that OSWALD was not part of a CIA Operation, when in reality, the men who ran him, were in fact staff members of the CIA.

ANGLETON'S super-secret component, CI/SIG, had a slush fund which gave him access to enormous amounts of unaudited money. He also had authority to report expenditures by certification, which meant he did not need vouchers or records to support his claim for reimbursement. He needed only to certify that he spent the money. Safes covered the walls of his outer office and he maintained a nearby vault room. Edward Petty stated: "I read some of those files. Nobody had access to them except ANGLETON. You might think you knew a lot about him, but you didn't necessarily know everything about him. He was a strictly a lone wolf, a strange bird. The man was doing all sorts of things on his own that nobody ever told him to do, or that was any of his business at all, there is no doubt about it. ANGLETON did, in quotes, run operations. What an ANGLETON operation was, nobody really knows."

After ANGLETON retired from the CIA, a search was conducted to find the records documenting ANGLETON'S contacts with KGB mole Kim Philby. CIA officers were unable to locate these reports. Philby met with ANGLETON at least 36 times. Tom Mangold reported: "There is no trail or indexing of the missing memoranda in the CIA central registry...No one could have stopped ANGLETON from destroying it." Paul Garbler commented, "The contact reports with their meetings. ANGLETON destroyed all of those. It's been pretty well established. None were ever found. None was found at all. It's believed that ANGLETON destroyed those after Philby showed up in Moscow."

ANGLETON believed the CIA had been penetrated by a mole. Even if this was true, the KGB would have discovered nothing compromising about OSWALD if the KGB had its mole examine the CIA's records on OSWALD after his defection. There were no official CIA project records on ANGLETON'S Project OSWALD for the mole to find, because it was a rogue operation with no approval from Allen Dulles, the Director of the CIA. Additionally, at ANGLETON'S request, no CIA documents were generated about OSWALD for 15 months after he defected except for minor memo consisting of only a few sentences. These were generated at the time of OSWALD'S defection as a result of an inquiry by the FBI. There wasn't a CIA file on OSWALD prior to December 9, 1960 in which all the documents about him were kept. Not only were there no records that linked OSWALD to ANGLETON, there were no CIA records on OSWALD, period. The only files that existed in the CIA's filing cabinets that concerned OSWALD were FBI and State Department documents referred to the CIA.

In September 1975 Counter-Intelligence Staff member Paul Hartman drafted a Memorandum for the Chief, Counter-Intelligence Staff (ANGLETON), stating that on November 27, 1963, he was instructed by Raymond Rocca, his immediate superior, to check Agency files in order to determine if OSWALD had been used by, or was connected with, the CIA. Paul Hartman checked with Records Integration Division , Deputy Director/Plans, Domestic Contacts Division , Division D, SE Division, the Cuban Operations Group of the Latin American Division, Medical Services, Counter-Intelligence/Operational Approval, CRS, and Office of Security/Security Research Service: "The results were negative" as well they should have been, since OSWALD worked for ANGLETON, not the CIA. [CIA 1188-1000]

The first document on OSWALD was a State Department cable dated October 31, 1959. The HSCA reported: "A confidential, State Department telegram dated October 31, 1959, sent from Moscow to Washington and forwarded to the CIA reported OSWALD, a recently discharged Marine, had appeared at the U.S. Embassy, Moscow...and has offered the Soviets any information he has acquired as [an] enlisted radar operator." This cable was first routed to the CIA's Office of Security where a file was opened on OSWALD which was known as Security File # 351-164. The location of the original of this document was found in this file.

It was somewhat odd that this document was found in the files of the Office of Security. The original should have been routed by the Records Integration Group (RID) to CI/SIG which routinely handled defector matters. CIA/Office of Security files are maintained primarily to record actions taken by the Office of Security in granting or denying security clearances to those persons whose relationship with the Agency gives them access to classified information. The Rockefeller Commission reported: "The bulk of the files maintained by the Office of Security consist of approximately 90,000 security dossiers, each relating to the security investigation of a specific Subject (person, organization, business or project) of Agency interest. About one third of these files are retired. About 90% of the security files relate to individuals, a majority of whom are United States citizens. The remaining 10% relate to organizations, businesses etc. A few Office of Security files are maintained on persons who are unaware that they have any Agency relationship. Likewise, clearance information may be maintained by the Office of Security on persons whom the Agency is thinking of contacting, or foreign nationals of potential operational use, even if the Agency consequently decides not to contact the individuals, or contacts them and they refuse to assist the Agency. Some Office of Security files have been compiled on organizations and individuals thought to pose a threat to Agency personnel, installations or operations. But, as a practical matter, 95% of all requests to establish new files are routine, and are undertaken at the request of the Office of Security Clearance Division, which insures that a security clearance is approved before access is granted to classified Agency information." [RR p247]. The Directors of the Office of Security have included Sheffield Edwards, Howard Osborne and Leo Dunn. Bruce Solie was head of OS Research.

ANGLETON had an associate in the Office of Security request the OSWALD document from RID so that his component seemingly could claim it had no knowledge of OSWALD should something go wrong with the OSWALD Operation.

Edward Petty disagreed: "There simply isn't anything there to indicate a real interest in OSWALD [because of OS interest]. It simply has to do with interagency exchange of information on people who've gone aboard. That's all there is to it. The Office of Security had every right to receive the document, if it asked for it.

"But the Office of Security, CI/SIG and ANGLETON weren't engaging in any operations based upon these documents. I know CI/SIG, I know what they did. It was not an operational group. That's true, that's the way it is, and no amount of speculation will make any change in it. It's true that ANGLETON did a lot of things on his own, sometimes - probably more times than not - at least somebody in CI/SIG would know what he was doing. At the same time he did things which I am sure we did not know anything of...I'm really not trying unduly to debunk you, anything is possible. I think if what you were saying was true, I think I would know it. That's basically what I am going on. And I don't think it is true. I wasn't there when this particular thing was going on, so I can't rule everything out. Because I was first there in 1966, that doesn't mean that I wouldn't have known about it. Part of my job was to make myself familiar with all the material. There was so much of it, I do not remember everything. However, when you add the sum total of my actual knowledge of this material with what people did and did not do, your contention does not make sense. I don't believe for one minute that ANGLETON was engaged in running OSWALD. I don't think ANGLETON had anything to do with OSWALD. He had to do with a great many things which were of a lot of interest, but not that one. If I could find something there I would be very interested in it, but honestly I don't."

The CIA had little or no interest in OSWALD and documents about him were scattered in several files, rather than in an OSWALD dossier. OSWALD had threatened to give military secrets to the Soviets and the CIA should have opened up a dossier on him. Yet they showed little interest in OSWALD. Agency officials who were questioned by the HSCA testified that the substance of the October 31, 1959, cable was sufficiently important to warrant the opening of a 201 file. The Clandestine Service Handbook No. 43-1-1 CSHB 70-1-1 Chapter III, ANNEX B February 15, 1960 stated: "7. Stations or branches often are concerned with personalities not of general CS concern. Files on these may be kept in any desired order. Should such personalities become of general CS interest, they must be brought into the 201 system." But because ANGLETON was secretly running OSWALD, CI/SIG did not request that Headquarters open an OSWALD dossier upon receipt of this significant information. Edward Petty was asked, "Could the quality of information trigger the opening of a 201 file?" He responded, "It wouldn't necessarily. You wouldn't immediately, necessarily open a 201 file, there might be a related file in which the document belongs. There may be a case file of some sort in which it belongs."

Evidence of the CI/SIG's studied disinterest in OSWALD was found in the CIA's Routing and Record Sheets. Edward Petty told this researcher: "The Routing and Record Sheet is circulated to see if anyone might be interested in a particular document. It simply goes around the circle and comes back. The document is being shopped. You can't tell if a component had an interest, except that they passed it on. They could have copied it, but basically they would have retained it if they had an interest."

The Routing And Record Sheet from the Office of Security that was attached to the first document on OSWALD generated by Richard E. Snyder, has not yet been declassified. We do not know if ANGLETON and CI/SIG ever received a copy.

The location of the original of next document on OSWALD was OS File 351-164 which was an article dated November 1, 1959, about OSWALD from The Washington Post. The location of the original of the next Foreign Service Dispatch on OSWALD dated November 2, 1959, was in Richard Snyder's 201-file. The first time CI was made aware of OSWALD was on November 2, 1959 because of an "Internal note dated November 2, 1959, (oral FBI name check request) and NO RECORD reply dated November 4, 1959. The location of the original of this document was found in CI/LSN." This document read: "OSWALD, LEE HARVEY. Mr. Papich would like to know what we know about this ex-Marine who recently defected in the USSR. November 2, 1959. Mr. Papich was advised that we had no info on SAC. November 4, 1959." [CIA 592-252B] A telex regarding John Pic, and two newspaper clippings, were added to the OS file on OSWALD in 1959. In May 1960 the OS and CI/SIG both created a Biographic Summary on OSWALD. The original of a FBI document dated May 12, 1960, on OSWALD was found in 74-500.

All totaled, the Location of Originals broke down this way when examined after the Kennedy assassination: Office of Security: 9 OSWALD Files. CI/SIG: 10 OSWALD Files. OSWALD'S 201 File: 12 OSWALD Files. In 1993 the CIA released a list of the original location of OSWALD documents. Of the documents received prior to the opening of OSWALD'S 201 file, six were found in the CIA's Office of Security file 351-164; four in CI/SIG; three in CI/SIG but were "Rec'd December 6, 1963"; one in CI/LSN [Jane Atherton Roman Counter-Intelligence liaison]; one in 201-289,248 (OSWALD'S 201-file); one in file 74-500; one in the DDP files and one, received by the CIA on November 3, 1959, in file number 201-074,8009 (Richard E. Snyder's 201 file).

The CIA released a "List of Items In OSWALD'S 201 File which predate its opening." No CIA originated documents on OSWALD were located aside from cover sheets. [NARA 1993.06.19.08:48:00:12000 4.13.64]

The HSCA requested that the CIA indicate where documents about OSWALD had been internally disseminated and stored prior to the opening of his 201 file on December 9, 1960. It was advised: "Because document dissemination records of relatively low national security significance are retained for only a five year period, they were no longer in existence for the years 1959 to 1963. Consequently, the Agency was unable to explain either when these documents had been received, or by which component." [HSCA R p200]

In 1992 it was discovered that the CIA had lied to the HSCA. Most of the document dissemination records did exist - including some of those that were generated prior to the opening of OSWALD'S 201 file. When HSCA Chief Counsel Robert Blakey was questioned about the Routing and Record Sheets by this researcher in 1993 he responded, "You are talking about something 15 years ago and I don't have a specific memory on that one way or the other. We did the best we could to prove that OSWALD was Agency-connected in some fashion but we were unable to do so - I don't think he was."

Paul Garbler, the CIA HSCA liaison, was asked about this by this researcher: "From the very start it became our task to tell the HSCA that CIA was not involved in the Kennedy assassination. In the course of this, a lot of information that we gave them became distorted out of the HSCA Staff's sense of bias. They came to the case with bias, and that bias persisted. The [Routing and Record Sheets] were merely a record of what happened to documents. And CIA claimed at that time they had been destroyed?"

The CIA denied to the HSCA that the CIA's document dissemination records on OSWALD existed and the CIA is still withholding some dissemination records because one of them indicates that the document on OSWALD which mentioned his threat to divulge classified information to the Soviets was not retained by CI/SIG. ANGLETON kept as far away from OSWALD as possible, so his complicity has to be explained in terms of what he didn't do, rather than what he did. When these OSWALD documents circulated, ANGLETON kept his own initials off them, just as he kept his name off all Warren Commission documents. But the initials of his subordinates Scott Miler and Elizabeth Ann Egerter appeared on them. All pre-201 (December 1960) CIA-generated documents on OSWALD were either never generated, or destroyed.

Evidence suggested that although ANGLETON did not reveal the nature of OSWALD'S mission to his colleagues in the CIA, the name of ANGLETON'S defector, LEE OSWALD, was known to certain key personnel the Office of Security, and to some members of CI/SIG.Just ANGLETON and perhaps one or two trusted associates who were in key positions in the CIA knew that ANGLETON had made contact with OSWALD through HEMMING and that OSWALD was in the Soviet Union at ANGLETON'S request.

Two former CIA employees claimed that OSWALD was an official CIA operation and was on the CIA's payroll. James and Elsie Wilcott were recruited by the CIA as a husband and wife team in the late 1950's, shortly after their marriage. Their first tour of duty was in Japan (1960 to 1964) where they worked under Chief of Station William V. Broe, after which they returned to Washington, D.C. Elsie Wilcott worked as a secretary in the Soviet Bloc Division, James Wilcott as a finance officer.

"November 24, 1963, was when I first heard about the CIA somehow being involved. Not long before going off duty, talk about OSWALD'S connection with CIA was making the rounds. While this kind of talk was a jolt to me, I didn't really take it seriously then. Very heavy talk continued up to about the middle of January. Based solely on what I heard at the Tokyo Station, I became convinced the following scenario is true: CIA people killed Kennedy. Either it was an outright project of Headquarters with the approval of McCone, or it was done outside, perhaps under the direction of Dulles and Bissell..OSWALD was recruited from the military for the express purpose of becoming a double agent assignment to the USSR. It was said they had some kind of special handle on him. Perhaps, went the speculation, they had discovered that he had murdered someone or committed some other serious crime, during a routine lie detector test. In any case it was a very risky assignment. CIA taught him Russian and it was said he had been to the farm (CIA's agent training camp, Camp Peary, Virginia) although probably not in one of the regular agent training programs. He may not have even known he had been there. (That was often done with special cases. They would be put to sleep and wake up in a strange place and be told that it was some other place than the farm). Although they said that he knew he was working for CIA, he was kept rigidly compartmented from any of the normal contacts that a regular CIA employee would have. The operational people that I knew never admitted they were working on the project, although some hinted at it. Jerry Fox, a SR agent who purchased Soviet information, may have been one of them. The Deputy Chief of SR (first name was Dave, I've forgotten his last name) may also have been one too. More than once I was told something like 'so and so was working on the OSWALD Project back in the late 1950's.'

"When OSWALD returned from the USSR in June of 1962, either on his way back, or after he got back, he was brought back to Japan to either Atsugi or Yokosuka for debriefing, it was assumed. At one point, soon after RUBY shot OSWALD, I was talking with someone, I can't recall who for sure, and I expressed disbelief about OSWALD being a CIA project. I was told something like this: 'Well James, OSWALD drew an advance some time in the past from you or for that project under such and such a cryptonym.' It was a familiar cryptonym at the time, which I have since forgotten, as well as the time that the advance of the funds was drawn...At first I thought these guys were nuts, but then a man I knew and had worked with before showed up to take a disbursement and told me OSWALD was a CIA employee. I didn't believe him until he told me the cryptonym under which OSWALD had drawn funds when he returned from Russia to the U.S.A."

James Wilcott said he was not privy to the type of project involved, since "project funds were disbursed on a code basis; as a disbursement officer, he would not have been apprised of the substantive aspects of the project." [NYT 3.27.78; WR p256; East Bay Tribune 9.18.78 pB13; San Francisco Chronicle 9.12.78; statement of James Wilcott with attach. ARA doc.]

By November 1964, James Wilcott had established relationships with American civil rights activists:

August 31, 1965

TO: Deputy Director of Security for Personnel Security

FROM: Deputy Chief, Personnel Security Division

SUBJECT: Wilcott, James Bernard Jr. #109 301

1. Tab B presents the results of an interview of the Subject conducted at Miami, Florida, and Tab C directs that certain checks be accomplished prior to the polygraph of the Subject.

2. The FBI has furnished extensive information concerning Ray Robinson, Jr., James Monsonis (Monsonus) and Reta Betty Rotondi.

3. Monsonis and his wife, Lenore Gensburg Monsonis, have participated in racial picketing and James Monsonis is President of the National Student Christian Federation. James Monsonis in December 1964, according to the FBI, was the Director of the Student Non-Violent Coordinating Committee, Washington, D.C. and several well known CP members were connected with SNICK or visited SNICK in December 1964.

4. The FBI furnished a copy of an investigation concerning Reta Betty Rotondi conducted in October 1964 and revealed that an informant revealed that Betty Rotondi is self-identified as a CP member in June 1964 and in August 1964 as one of two CP members who worked in CORE as Task Force leader. Informant made available information indicating Betty Rotondi accepted in Queens County CP Club in February 1946 and from 1948 to and including 1954. Betty Rotondi's CP associates were set forth.

5. Ray Robinson Jr. - participated in the Quebec-Washington-Guantanamo Walk for Peace sponsored by the Committee for Non-Violent Action and on November 19, 1963 was arrested by the police at Macon, Georgia for distributing literature against city ordinances. Ray Robinson has an extensive arrest record dating back to 1954, which included assault with a deadly weapon, intoxication, possession of narcotics, armed robbery etc.

6. Concerning Alex Passikloff, the FBI indicated they have no identifiable information pertinent to our inquiry.

7. In compliance with paragraph 2 of Reference C, a written report concerning Subject's arrest in November 1964 in Washington, D.C. indicated that the Subject and one Ray Robinson Jr. were arrested for being drunk. The arresting officer advised that Subject and Robinson were arrested for drunkenness and were also disorderly, but were not so charged. Subject and Robinson, according to the arresting officer, were very intoxicated and fighting among themselves.

8. Relative to paragraph 3 of Reference C, the New York Field office of IOS furnished information that Alexander Passikloff has been known to them since 1938. Passikloff has an extensive police record and in 1963 was arrested three times in connection with anti-segregation (pro-integration) protest demonstrations. There were indications of possible CP membership and/or affiliation of Passikloff. Information indicates that Passikloff in 1950 reportedly told somebody that he had been expelled from the CP. Passikloff, in 1963, participated in sit-ins sponsored by CORE on at least three separate occasions in New York City.

9. In addition Passikloff was arrested on August 5, 1964 in Jersey City, New Jersey during the course of a race riot. He was charged with disorderly conduct and possession of a knife. It was also indicated that Passikloff had been treated at the Creedmore State Hospital for a mental disorder.

10. The New York City Police Department contained no record of Joseph or Betty Rotondi.

11. Concerning Blyden Brown Jackson, the New York Police Department indicates that Byden Brown Jackson is Chairman of the East River chapter of CORE. Jackson has a police record dating from 1958, his last arrest was on April 22, 1964 for disorderly conduct and resisting an arrest. Jackson has participated in racial demonstrations and sit-ins and in April of 1964 is listed among a group of individuals furnished by the U.S. Secret Service regarding security escort to the President of the United States.

12. Jackson was arrested by the New York City Police Department on January 11, 1965 and charged with felonious assault and Jackson is known to the psychiatric division of Bellevue Hospital in New York.

13. It is recommended that Subject be polygraphed concerning his association with the above individuals. It is recommended that coordination be effected with Jerry Mullane, Security Officer, WH Division, who is aware of this case to have Subject report to Headquarters for polygraph examination or arrange to have the Subject polygraphed in Miami, Florida, which ever is convenient.

14. It is further recommended that this polygraph examination be administered as soon as possible. Leland E. Bunn.

James Wilcott resigned in April 1966, after nine years of CIA employment. He became friendly with CIA defector Philip Agee and broke his secrecy agreement with the Agency in 1968. In 1978 James Wilcott testified at a CIA tribunal in Havana, then testified before the HSCA.

Elsie Wilcott agreed with her husband: "Right after the President was killed, people in the Tokyo Station were talking openly about OSWALD having gone to Russia for the CIA. Everyone was wondering how the Agency was going to be able to keep the lid on OSWALD. But I guess they did." Elsie Wilcott never testified before the HSCA.

The HSCA concluded that, "Based on all the evidence, James Wilcott's allegation was not worthy of belief." [HSCA R p200] The Committee based its conclusion on interviews with CIA personnel, including one who was named as a participant in one of these conversations. This CIA person told the HSCA he was transferred from the Tokyo CIA Station to the United States in 1962, so that he could not possibly have had the conversation with Wilcott. His CIA employment records substantiated this. The HSCA interviewed everyone who had served at the Tokyo CIA Station during this period. Not one had any recollection that such conversation ever took place.

Wilcott had this information in November 1963. He underwent a transformation to a radical in August 1965. He left the CIA in April 1966. He came foward with his charges in 1978. What took him so long? It was not common knowledge at the CIA that OSWALD was a CIA Operation. Only ANGLETON and a few of his associates were aware of OSWALD'S true status. Most CIA personnel probably thought OSWALD was a tool of the Cubans and Soviets. Wilcott stated that OSWALD had drawn funds when he returned from Russia to the U.S.A. This was unlikely. The Wilcotts were propagandists. They floated a false new story against the CIA, for whatever their reasons.

As stated, the CIA component charged with investigating defectors like OSWALD was CI/SIG and was run by JAMES ANGLETON. It was hidden within the Counter-Intelligence Branch. According to the CIA, CI/SIG - the Special Investigations Group or Unit - handled the more important CIA investigations. The word "special" generally meant Secret. For example, the Special Operations Division of the OSS, the CIA's Special Operations Group in Vietnam and the New York City Police Department's Bureau of Special Services. [Powers, Secrets p401]

The CIA stated that CI/SIG was "a small staff usually charged with investigation and analysis of the most important security cases..In connection with reference request for information concerning a charter pertaining to the CI/SIG unit within the Directorate of Operations the following information is provided.

A. The only available information concerning a charter for the Special Investigations Unit (later referred to as Special Investigations Group) is contained in CSI 70-1 (tentative) dated March 2, 1955. A Xerox copy of the pertinent portions are attached.

B. The above mentioned Clandestine Services Notice officially established the Counter-Intelligence Staff, and as part of it, CI/SIG. CI/SIG was abolished in the 1973 reorganization of the Counter-Intelligence Staff but the reasons for it are not recorded.

C. To the best of our knowledge there is no record of the existence of any operational plans pertaining to CI/SIG. B. Hugh Tovar, Chief Counter-Intelligence Staff. [CIA 1993 o4199 CI 260-78 for PCS/LOC Norbert Shepanek Response to Office of Legislative Counsel Trace Request Reference OLC-78-2185/1 6.19.78]

CSI 70-1 stated: "Special Intelligence Unit performs the Counter-Intelligence investigation and analysis of any known or potential security leak in the Clandestine Services organization, whether in headquarters or in the field, from the standpoint of its effect on existing operations, and

the cover of personnel. In performing this function, maintains close working relations with the Office of Security, the latter being primarily concerned in such cases from Agency security rather than an operational security standpoint." A chart attached to this document indicated CI/SIG was directly responsible to ANGLETON.

ANGLETON told the HSCA: "I set [CI/SIG] up in 1954 so that no one in the Counter-Intelligence [Staff]...would ever have access to anybody's [CIA] security file. I chose an individual [Birch O'Neal] who had been ex-FBI...as the man to run that component...In the event there was an allegation about an employee, he could review the entire file [with the CIA Office of Security which]...has sole possession of security files and is responsible for the security clearance of personnel." ANGLETON added that CI/SIG kept lists of defectors to the United States and managed sensitive cases involving Americans which were not being handled by any other U.S. Government department. He said these functions were deliberately referred to only in "fairly camouflaged terms" and were "very much fuzzed over," even within the CIA, in order to preserve the Unit's secrecy. [HSCA ANGLETON Deposition w/h but cited in Cold Warrior by Mangold; Ang. Rock. Comm. test. also w/h]

ANGLETON biographer Tom Mangold wrote: "The most secret component of ANGLETON'S empire was a short distance down the hallway to the left of his office. Little is known of it to this day. Formally designated as the Special Investigation Group - or CI/SIG - it was a small elite unit consisting of eight of ANGLETON'S most trusted and closed mouth people. The unit included a chief, deputy, two officers and a small support staff of assistants and secretaries. ANGLETON had set up CI/SIG shortly after he became Counter-Intelligence Chief in order to investigate the possibilities that the CIA itself might have been penetrated by the KGB...The CI/SIG was so secret that many members of the Counter-Intelligence Staff didn't even know it existed, and nearly everyone was denied access to it. Over the years, as the unit grew in importance, its true function became increasingly obscured, until only a handful of insiders actually understood its work. It was effectively removed from all peer or executive supervision. Secret units within a Secret unit were a hallmark of ANGLETON, the CI/SIG and the Counter-Intelligence staff. Unsurprisingly, internal conflict grew, and by the late 1950's resentment of the Counter-Intelligence's staff supervisory role - as secret policemen over its own agency colleagues - was mounting."

Clare Edward Petty was born in Oklahoma December 2, 1920; from 1943 to 1946 he was an artillery officer and was in military government in Germany. He joined the CIA in 1947 and worked with the Reinhardt Gehlen organization of former Nazi Army General Staff Officers for eight years. Edward Petty stated: "It was determined at Nuremberg these men were never Nazi party members. They opposed the party. Gehlen had the files on the Soviet Order of Battle. We needed it." Petty joined CI/SIG in 1966.

Edward Petty recounted: "CI/SIG had to do with other things besides the so-called mole hunt that was instigated by ANGLETON and Golitsyn. There were a number of very sensitive things which ANGLETON would just automatically send to CI/SIG, and OSWALD was one of them. Those records were undoubtedly pulled out of other files, they didn't actually originate in CI/SIG, CI/SIG simply had the authority, capability and regularly pulled files from everyplace. CI/SIG would keep the papers on it [American defectors] and if there was something they could do about it they would, as you say, handle it. It was basically an office of record of such things, it was not an action office. Memoranda were routed to other agencies which would be generally signed by ANGLETON. CI/SIG did not carry on active investigations or operations, it was an analysis group. It had a paper sort of analysis capability. They absolutely did not run operations. They had access to all the documents, and that was the critical point where things were put together to determine, for example, a possible penetration involving CIA personnel, in which case you would go immediately to the Office of Security, and begin to cooperate on investigations. In the case of OSWALD, the chances would be extremely high that if CIA had anything to say about OSWALD, having checked CIA files, they would have said it to the FBI and that would be the end of it. CI/SIG carried on operational security type correspondence with the FBI. That was the point of liaison for that type of material. So anything that had to do with that sort of thing would go into CI/SIG files. We gauged the security problems in various Agencies. After all, things like that were usually not isolated. You have to look for connections between various things. Like the National Security Administration defectors, Martin & Mitchell, that bears upon security overall. There was a file on them in CI/SIG.

"I have to tell you, I don't actually remember the OSWALD file, I would have thought that I had read all such files but I don't remember it. I don't remember an OSWALD file in CI/SIG [in 1966]. In CI/SIG we had a very large three-room vault that was filled with such material which did not necessarily indicate that action was being taken. They keep paper on those things so they can watch the overall picture. In counter-intelligence, what you need is continuity and a totality of access. This was just part of the totality of their access. It doesn't mean they did anything about it necessarily. If action was taken, it was likely to have been simply correspondence with another component passing information or asking for information. I consider myself to be very well-informed on all of that material that was in CI/SIG. There would have been no analysis unless it seemed to tie to something else. After all OSWALD sat in the base in which the U-2 flew into and out of Japan...I say that based on everything I know about CI/SIG and everything I know about the OSWALD business and subsequently in relation to [KGB "defector"] Yuri Nosenko. The kind of organization that CI/SIG was, there were so few people there, we could not have possibly been running such operations...The absolute top [of CI/SIG] was eight people and that would be secretaries and everything..."

"You know what CI/SIG was? Find the mole. That's all they had to do. I have no idea what they were doing with files on OSWALD. You opened this conversation by talking about a relationship between OSWALD and ANGLETON. I totally unaware that there ever was one. I am unaware that CI/SIG ever had anything to do with OSWALD at all. I could see that ANGLETON would have retained for his custody only some kind of OSWALD file. I am unaware of which kind. I am not making an apologia, I am not trying to defend the CIA here. I merely telling you what I know, and what I do not know. I never knew that CI/SIG had any concern about OSWALD at all. CI/SIG was devoted, in my memory, to find the mole." Edward Petty commented, "I can see why somebody from the outside would say that. In very, very rough terms I suppose you can say that's true, although I never used to work moles." It was suggested that ANGLETON may have been watching OSWALD because he thought he had become a double-agent. Garbler: "A lot of paranoia existed back then. There is no question about that. CI/SIG found me to be guilty, before they had any evidence, as a mole."

William Hood was born in Maine on April 19, 1920. He was a former newspaper correspondent and OSS officer. In the CIA, William Hood was stationed in Vienna, (February 1951 to January 1955), Munich (Economic Office, August 1957), Berlin (Political Office, December 1959 to March 1960), and Washington (November 1962 to April 1964). William Hood joined the Counter-Intelligence Staff in 1973. William Hood said it was much later than 1973.

Newton S. Miler, the son of a meat packer, was born in Mason City, Iowa on March 1, 1926. He was an analyst in the Navy in 1946. Newton S. Miler joined the CIA in 1947 and worked as a Case Officer in Japan and in the Philippines. He was a research analyst from 1949 to 1956. In 1956 he was in Thailand as an employee of the International Cooperation Administration, training police. He was listed as a Department of the Army area analyst in 1958. [1969 State Department Biographic Register] From May 1958 to June 1961 Newton S. Miler was in Washington where he was on the Counter-Intelligence Staff, dealing with Soviet counter-intelligence. In July 1961 he became CIA Chief of Station in Addis Ababa and in 1964 he joined CI/SIG. He was Counter-Intelligence Deputy Chief and at the same time had the responsibility for CI/SIG. Newton S. Miler stated: "The main thing we were doing was the search for penetrations. That was the primary thing..." [Wise, Molehunt, p27, Mangold, Cold Warrior]

The hunt for Soviet spies within the CIA started after Kim Philby was forced to resign as British Security Service Director in 1951. In 1963 Kim Philby defected to the USSR. In 1964 the HONETOL Committee was formed to look into the mole question. It was in existence from November 1964 to April 1965, and consisted of ANGLETON, Newton S. Miler and Bruce Solie from the CIA's Office of Security, FBI domestic intelligence chief William C. Sullivan, FBI CIA liaison Sam Papich and two others. About six members of CI/SIG worked on HONETOL, including Edward Petty. Author David Wise reported other CIA officers assigned to HONETOL included Jean M. Evans, who had worked with Reinhardt Gehlen, Albert P. Kergel, John D. Walker (former Chief of Station in Israel), Charles Arnold and William F. Potocki (a former subordinate of William K. Harvey). CIA Soviet Bloc Division officers Tennent Bagley and David Murphy were the targets of this mole hunt. Both were found innocent of being moles.

When William Colby became Director/Counter-Intelligence on May 10, 1973, he was the recipient of a report prepared by Clare Edward Petty which stated ANGLETON was the KGB mole in the CIA. Edward Petty's report suggested that ANGLETON had studied under, and been too close to, Kim Philby; had spread disinformation when he suggested the Sino/Soviet split had been contrived; and had trusted Anatoliy Golitsyn. Edward Petty suggested ANGLETON demoralized the CIA: "ANGLETON put forth the proposition that the KGB was so totally superior, and so all-knowing, that anything CIA or any of the other allied intelligence services tried to do was negated from the word go. The operational side was totally frustrated over a period of years. ANGLETON propounded the proposition that operations against the Soviets were doomed to failure." To William Colby, Edward Petty's report was a product of "the ultra-conspiratorial turn of mind" which he disliked in ANGLETON.

During World War II, William Colby (born January 4, 1920), was a Jedburgh who parachuted into German-occupied Europe more that once. After the war, he was Chief of Station in Rome. Between 1965 and 1972 Colby served in South Vietnam. During much of this period he was director of OPERATION PHOENIX, an effort to identify, imprison or recruit Vietcong members in South Vietnam. Some 20,587 Vietcong "suspects" were killed during OPERATION PHOENIX. Colby later told a House Committee there had been some "illegal killing" but he argued that he worked to halt such abuse.

ANGLETON and CI/SIG opened an OSWALD dossier, or 201 file. only because it was forced to do so.

This researcher, who once believed that the 201 file was a CIA employment file, has come to realize that a CIA 201 file is not necessarily a CIA employment file. Fidel Castro has a gigantic 201-file and he does not work for the CIA. The CIA indicated: "A CIA 201 file is opened when a person is considered to be of potential intelligence or counter-intelligence significance. The opening of such a file is designed to serve the purpose of placing certain CIA information pertaining to that individual in one centralized records system. The 201 file is maintained in a folder belonging to the Directorate for Plans, the CIA component responsible for clandestine activities. The existence of a 201 file does not necessarily connote any actual relationship or contact with the CIA." [HSCA R p200] When Attorney Marvin Miller asked ANGLETON if a CIA 201 file always meant CIA employment, he said: "Not necessarily." Asked to elaborate, his CIA attorney interjected: "On behalf of Director Turner, I would object to any question requiring a definition of 201 file. That information does remain classified."

Edward Petty stated: "All personalities of any interest whatever, would be assigned 201 numbers. The 201 does not at all indicate operational interest, except that for some reason, someone decided to keep it and assign a number; because if you retrieve it from the file you've got to have it numbered. Any personality of any interest at all to the CIA operations side, got a 201 file. 201 files would not normally be opened on Staff members. The personnel files for Staff members were held by the Office of Security. Those are Security Files and have another designation. Agent personnel would have 201 files. But a 201 file is simply a personality file of anybody who was ever of interest to the CIA. A great many people who were of almost no interest to the CIA would have 201 files simply because if you have information on a person and you don't want to throw it away, you open a 201 file on him."

In CIA Diary, CIA defector Philip Agee wrote: "Files are maintained on all agents and they always begin with the number 201, followed by a number of five to eight digits. The 201 file contains all the documents that pertain to a given agent..." [Agee CIA Diary p59]

Richard Helms told Mr. Goldsmith of the HSCA: "My recollection is that when an individual was an agent of the Agency all the papers on him were taken over by the division that was handling him and there was nothing available in the central records to identify him as an agent. Now there obviously would be exceptions to that but in the case where there were exceptions, I would think all that would be in the file, the central file, would be a carding saying to the FE Division or something...My impression was, the original impression, all the papers were kept in the Division that was handling the agent...I don't remember anymore how this dilemma was resolved about running traces, and on a fellow who was already an agent and how we dealt with the problem of protecting that fact, I don't remember, I don't recall anymore."

The regular 201 file generally contained information such as place of birth, family, occupation and organizational affiliation. In addition, a sensitive file might be also maintained on that same person. The sensitive file generally encompassed matters which were potentially embarrassing to the Agency or matters obtained from sources, or by methods that the Agency sought to protect." [RR p144] Richard Helms disagreed: "My recollection is that there was one 201 file. I wouldn't be surprised if there were occasional cases where the thing was so sensitive that somebody made a separate file in order to protect a certain category of information." Agee stated: "The 201 file is divided into two parts that are stored separately for maximum security. One part contains true name documents while the other part contains cryptonym documents and operational information."

The CIA had stipulated that a 201 file could mean Agency-employment. But, what percentage of the 201 files indicated employment, and what percentage indicated mere intelligence interest? While studying OPERATION CHAOS, an illegal CIA program, the Rockefeller Commission discovered that 300,000 names of American dissidents were stored in a CIA computer. For some of these individuals, "a 201 or personality file would be opened when enough information had been collected to warrant a file or when the individual was of interest to another government agency that looked to the CIA for information." The Rockefeller Commission came across the general breakdown of 201 files: "An analysis by the Agency of a group of [201] files opened on American citizens in 1974, as reported to the Commission's staff, showed that 70% of these files were opened on persons who were sources of information or assistance to Agency, 19% related to Americans of possible use to the Agency and 11% related to Americans who were of foreign counter-intelligence interest."

If a 201 file existed on an American, there was an 89% chance he or she was of some use or possible use to the CIA. Since 201 represented employment 89% of the time, many former CIA Staff members and employees were certain it was exclusively an employment file.

Former CIA D/DP Staff member Victor Marchetti commented: "The 201 file originated in the Armed Services. An OSWALD 201 personnel file was located at Marine Corps Headquarters. [FBI NO-100-16601 12.9.63] It was a basic employment file containing pay receipts, sickness or accident reports, unit assignments, etc. It carried over into the CIA. For example, if I wanted to find out about an agent, say Philip Agee, I would call the relevant component and say, 'Send over Agee's 201 file.'" In a telephone interview, Victor Marchetti added: "If you can prove that it is a 201 file, that's the thing...if you can prove it was a 201 file then he was an Agent...at minimum a contact, but more likely an Agent."

Former CIA Agent Bradley E. Ayers, who trained anti-Castro Cubans for the Bay of Pigs invasion, observed: "The fact that OSWALD had one [a 201 file] is absolutely fantastic. It means he was either a contract agent, working for them full-time on contract over a period of time, or he was on some kind of CIA assignment." [rec. tel. con. in possession of Nat'l Enq. 4.26.77]

Former CIA Staff member Patrick McGarvey: "You've got a bombshell, man, you have the one that cracks the egg. If a guy had a 201 file, that means he's a full-time professional staff employee of that organization."

This researcher was also mistakenly convinced that OSWALD'S 201 file indicated he worked for the CIA in a official capacity. I sold the story to The National Enquirer for $20,000. The National Enquirer verified my contention that a CIA 201 file was a CIA employment file with the aforementioned former CIA agents, then published it, despite the fact that it was not true. I had unwittingly floated a false news story that linked OSWALD to the CIA.

ANGLETON examined OSWALD as little as possible. As stated, no CIA documents existed on OSWALD until his 201 file was opened on December 9, 1960. David E. Murphy, Soviet Russia Division Chief, was told by Allen Dulles that "Warren Commission members could not understand why CIA had not begun an investigation of OSWALD as soon as it received word that he had defected." [CIA 56-20; CIA 652-827] CI/SIG should have opened a 201 File on OSWALD immediately after he threatened to give military information to the Soviets.

The Rockefeller Report: "The fact that a name has been entered into the index does not mean that a [201] file exists on that person. Files are open only at the direction of a division or staff and only when it appears that the person will be of continuing intelligence interest. In that case, a so-called personality (or 201) file is opened, i.e., a manila folder is prepared to hold relevant documents accumulating on that person."

A CIA Handbook stated: "201 dossiers should be opened in the following categories: (5) Persons on whom a Main Index search reveals information in five or more documents."

Edward Petty disagreed: "It's possible to have a 201 number assigned to an individual if there's just one document in the file."

The HSCA noted that a CIA Memorandum dated September 18, 1975, indicated: "OSWALD'S 201 file was opened on December 9, 1960, in response to the receipt of five documents: two FBI, two State Department and one Navy."

This explanation was inconsistent with the presence in OSWALD'S file of four 1959 State Department documents and a fifth dated May 25, 1960. If the opening of OSWALD'S 201 file was triggered by the CIA's receipt of documents, why wasn't it opened in MAY 1960, when five documents had accumulated?

The CIA commented: "'OSWALD'S 201 file had been opened on December 9, 1960 on the basis of the receipt of the first five documents.' This statement is not accurate. Although the writer of this memorandum made this statement (and it is quoted accurately) the OSWALD file was open following the completion of work in response to the State Department memorandum dated October 25, 1960." [NARA 1993.07.01.17:55:47:8100390]

The CIA Memorandum dated September 18, 1975, also claimed that the file was opened because of OSWALD'S defection and his possible re-entry into the United States.

OSWALD, however, never officially expressed to any U.S. Government official, an intention to return, until February 1961. The CIA Memorandum dated September 18, 1975, did not explain why the CIA waited over a year before opening an OSWALD 201 file. The HSCA still could not resolve this issue.

The HSCA reviewed CIA files of 11 individuals on a list of defectors supplied to the State Department from the CIA and determined that: "201 files were opened in December 1960, for each of the five (including OSWALD) who did not have 201 files prior to receipt of the State Department inquiry. In each case the slot for 'source document' referred to an Agency component [CI/SIG] rather than to a dated document." The HSCA interpreted the fact that five other 201 files on defectors were also opened in December 1960, to mean that there was nothing extraordinary about initiating OSWALD'S file at this time. However, it allowed: "This analysis only explained why a file on OSWALD was finally opened; it did not explain the seemingly long delay in the opening of the file."

The Committee tried again: "Finally, a reference to the original form that was used to start a file on OSWALD did not resolve this issue since the appropriate space that would normally indicate the 'source document' that initiated the action referred to CI/SIG rather than to a dated document." The CIA indicated to the HSCA that it was "customary to refer to a component when the opening action is taken on that component's authority."

There was nothing extraordinary about CI/SIG appearing in the Source Document Box. This was the component that handled defectors. The CIA, however, deleted the information in the source box for 30 years because it indicated that CI/SIG was the logical component that documents on OSWALD should have been routed to. It also indicated a familiarity on ANGLETON'S part with OSWALD while OSWALD was in the Soviet Union. Edward Petty was asked about why this information was withheld: "It's an internal indicator that has no real sense to anybody except to somebody who's going to read something into it."

To prove there was nothing irregular about CI/SIG waiting one year before opening an OSWALD 201 file, the HSCA did a broader analysis. It "reviewed the files of 13 of the 14 persons on the CIA's November 21, 1960, response to a State Department letter inquiring about defectors, and of 16 other defectors (from an original list of 380 supplied by the CIA) who were American-born, had defected during the years 1958 to 1963, and who had returned to the United States during that same time period." The HSCA stated that of 29 defectors whose files were reviewed, 8 had been the Subject of 201 files before the time of their defection. This group was of interest to the CIA before they defected. The HSCA: "In only 4 of the remaining 21 cases were 201 files opened at the time of their defection. The files on the 17 other defectors were opened from four months to several years after the defection.

None of the other defectors had openly threatened to give the Soviets classified military information about American radar. OSWALD was a special case and nothing could be gained by comparing him to how other defectors were treated.

The HSCA was finally "able to determine the basis for opening OSWALD'S file on December 9, 1960, by interviewing and then deposing Ann Egerter who was directly responsible for initiating the opening action. By her account the questioning focused on the circumstances of opening the file and possibly related procedural practices. Her story is a fairly simple one. There was a State Department request for information concerning a list of defectors. She did the basic work in preparing the information and then, on her own decision, opened 201 files on each of the individuals, totaling about 12 in all. One of them was LEE HARVEY OSWALD. She also, on her own decision, noted a restriction that required requesters for information on any of those people to contact CI Staff." [CIA OLC 78-2058 5.23.78]

The only reason CI/SIG had Plans open an OSWALD 201 file was because it had to due to Martin and Mitchell flap.

On September 6, 1960, one month before this document was written, William Martin & Bernon Mitchell, two mathematicians working for the National Security Administration, defected to Russia. They were discovered to be homosexuals, which indirectly led to the resignation of the personnel director of the National Security Administration, and the firing of 26 other employees for sexual deviation. Soon, the House of Representatives passed a bill giving the Secretary of Defense the power to fire National Security Administration employees without explanation and without appeal, if they were security risks. The White House wanted to know if there were any more defectors like Martin and Mitchell, capable of providing useful intelligence information to the Soviet Bloc.

On October 25, 1960, the Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department, Hugh C. Cummings, sent a letter to Richard Bissell, the Deputy Director/Plans of the CIA, which read:

Dear Dick:

Our efforts to answer recent informal inquiries, including some from the White House Staff, have revealed that, though the CIA and the FBI have detailed records concerning Americans who have been recruited as intelligence agents by Bloc countries, there does not appear to be a compete listing of these Americans now living in Bloc countries who might be called 'defectors.' Using definitions of DCID/4/2, these persons might be described as those who have either been capable of providing useful intelligence to the Bloc or those who desire to resettle in Bloc countries and had been significantly exploited for communist propaganda purposes. This would mean that no attention need be paid to Americans whose resettlement within the Bloc had no counter-intelligence implications or had attracted no particular attention; for instance this definition would not cover individual U.S. citizens or Eastern Europeans of Chinese origin who returned to the 'homeland' because they had never been completely assimilated into the American society. There is an attached list of such persons, covering the last 18 months, and it would be appreciated if the Agency could verify and possibly expand this list for the use of interested Bureaus of the Department. Sincerely yours, Hugh S. Cummings, Jr. Attachment: List of American 'Defectors' from May 1959 to October 1960. Secret. [CIA DD/P 05678]

The author of this letter, Hugh C. Cummings, Jr., a former Ambassador to Indonesia, was appointed Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the State Department in 1957. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research included numerous CIA personnel. William McAfee, the Chief of Staff for Coordination of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research in 1963, was listed in Who's Who in the CIA as having worked for the CIA under State Department cover since 1951. In April 1957 he entered the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, and by May 1960, he had been promoted to Supervisor, Intelligence Research Specialist. McAfee became Assistant Deputy Director for Coordination in June 1967. He was a Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research from 1972 through 1977. [State Dept. Bio. Reg. 1977] McAfee's Deputy, James D. Crowley, a Mexico Regional Administration Specialist, worked for the CIA since 1961. In November 1963 he was promoted to Intelligence Operations Specialist. [State Dept. Bio. Reg. 1977] John T. Noonan, Chief of the Intelligence Reporting Branch of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, was listed in Who's Who in the CIA. Note the reference to recent informal inquiries, including some from the White House staff. The words, "using the definitions of DCID 4/2" were withheld until 1992. The letters DCID may stand for Director/Counter-Intelligence/Directive - ANGLETON. The CIA denied my request for the substance of DCID 4/2, which was CIA-originated. The CIA Information Review Committee is currently reviewing this decision. [CIA FOIA F93-1559] On September 14, 1995, the CIA suggested I send my request to Frank M. Machak at the State Department. I have not as yet heard from Machak.

The name of Birch D. O'Neal, appeared on this document in two places. Copies of S. Herman Horton's letter were sent to COPS [Covert Operations?] Copies were sent to Acting Chief /Counter-Intelligence (Horton); SR/6/Stacy; SR/CE/Grady; CI/SIG.

The Association of Former Intelligence Officers 1983 Membership Directory listed a Harry L. Grady and William J. Grady. [Public Information Research POB 680635 San Antonio, Texas 78268]

The markings "C/CI/SIG:BDO'NEAL: bd x-2356 November 2, 1960," also appeared. S.H. Horton drafted a reply to the Bureau of Intelligence and Research on behalf of the CIA. The document contained markings "C/CI/SIG/ BO'NEAL:bd x-2356 November 18, 1960," as well as the identical dissemination markings found on the November 2, 1960, response to Hugh Cummings.

The CIA responded to this State Department request on November 21, 1960, and provided a long list of defectors and a paragraph about each of them. The information on OSWALD'S defection was classified Secret, as were seven of the 13 cases listed. The defection of the stepson of W.E.B. DuBois, "the well-known Negro leader and writer," was classified Secret. Robert Edward Webster's defection was Confidential. Five of the defections were unclassified, including Martin & Mitchell. [CIA 596-252F; WCD p69] The State Department sent this document to the White House to answer any questions it had about defectors.

Why wasn't OSWALD 201 file opened earlier due to the number and nature of documents which had accumulated about him?' The HSCA concluded that "opening a file years after a defection was not uncommon." OSWALD was not a common case.

Richard Helms stated: "I can't imagine why it would have taken an entire year. I am amazed. Defect to the USSR October 1959. This is December 1960. There wasn't a 201 file already in existence, I am amazed. Are you sure that there wasn't? Yes, (deleted) but (deleted) had they not opened a file a lot earlier. I can't explain that."

The HSCA's investigation of OSWALD'S 201 file was based largely on erroneous leads provided by this author:

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: Briefing of G. Robert Blakey, Chief Counsel of the HSCA July 25, 1977. Present at the briefing held (Deleted) CIA (six deletions)

1. The undersigned was called to brief Blakey on the Agency's official file on OSWALD. A copy of notes prepared for the briefing is attached.

2. The briefing, or more accurately, question and answer period, lasted about three quarters of an hour.

4. The first point the undersigned brought up in reference to the Staff's file on LEE HARVEY OSWALD was the document opening the file. The undersigned stated that this document had been released under provisions of Freedom of Information Act and a photograph of the sanitized version had appeared in the National Enquirer of April 26, 1977, along with the comment by a former CIA employee, Patrick McGarvey, that the existence of a 201 file on an individual meant the individual had been recruited by the Agency. The undersigned said such a statement was false." Gerald Posner wrote: "Robert Groden called the 201 a personnel file..."

The Field Personality 201 File Request and the index card follows:

TO: Headquarters, RI December 9, 1960.

FROM: CI/SIG - Ann Egerter 1408 J (x2621) ACTION: OPEN AMEND CLOSE.

SECTION I All known aliases and variants (including maiden name, if applicable) must be listed. If the identifying data varies with the alias used, a separate form must be used. Write 'Unknown' for the items you are unable to complete.

SECTION II: Cryptonym will be entered in Headquarters.

SECTION III: To be completed in all cases.

SENSITIVE / Non Sensitive [Neither box checked] 201 No. 201-289,248 Source Document CI/SIG

Name (Last) OSWALD (First) LEE (Middle) Henry (Title) Sex Male

Type Name (Last) (First) (Middle) (Title)

PHOTO. No. Birth Date October 18, 1939. Country of Birth U.S.A. City or Town of Birth New Orleans, Louisiana. Other Identification 1. AG

Occupation/Position Radar Operator, U.S. Marine Corps August 1960. Occupation/Position Code Navy.

Cryptonym Pseudonym

Country of Residence USSR - 074 Action Desk CI/SIG 731 2nd Country Interest SR 3rd Country Interest

COMMENTS: Cit? Defected to the USSR in October 1959.

PERMANENT CHARGE. No. Restricted. Yes. Signature Ann Egerter.

In early 1993 the CIA added what appeared to be a stapled addendum to OSWALD'S 201 file:

CITIZENSHIP & PASSPORTS

OSWALD, LEE HARVEY.

Department of State Instruction A-173, April 13, 1961; still on order October 5, 1961

Embassy's D-806, May 26, 1962, same SAC.

Moscow Embassy dispatch 234, November 2, 1959 received October 2, 1961

Please order for (deleted) SR/CI/P, [Soviet Russia /Counter-Intelligence (Plans)] 1044AJ (mail address)

Ordered through SR6/ (deleted.) [These deletions might significant since the Freedom of Information Section of the CIA went over these deletions with a pen, when it sent this researcher a copy].

An Index Card was created and filed with the DD/P as a result of this 201file being opened:

OSWALD, LEE HENRY

SEX M DOB OCTOBER 18, 1939 201-289248*

NEW ORLEANS, LA. USA

CIT ?

REF:

USSR

RADAR OPERATOR, U.S. MARINE CORPS AS OF 1960. DEFECTED TO USSR IN OCTOBER 1959.

The request to Headquarters to open a 201 file on OSWALD was sent to the Records Integration Division for processing on December 9, 1960.

The HSCA asked: "Why was he carried as LEE HENRY OSWALD in his 201 file? OSWALD'S 201 file was opened under the name LEE HENRY OSWALD. No Agency witness could explain why. All Agency personnel testified that this must have been occasioned innocently by bureaucratic error." The CIA assured the Committee that, even with an altered middle name, it could have found him in its files. Ann Egerter, who retired in 1969 and died on July 16, 1990, was asked about this error:

4. She was pressed on why the name LEE HENRY OSWALD appeared on appeared on one occasion, instead of correctly as LEE HARVEY OSWALD. She could not explain, speculating that it could have been either a mistake, or that someone other than herself made the entry as the handwriting appeared quite differently than the rest of her writing on the form. She pointed out she did all 12 folders at the same time and got tired of writing, which made her handwriting deteriorate." There were other inconsistencies: "Defected to the USSR in October 1959, Radar operator, U.S. Marine Corps as of 1960."

All of these sounded like an innocuous mistakes, but they were there for a reason. They appeared because of information supplied to Ann Egerter by CI/SIG. ANGLETON was deliberately leaving a paper trail that indicated CI/SIG had so little knowledge of, or interest in, OSWALD, it couldn't even get his name straight. Raymond Rocca would eventually correct it: "NB: HARVEY" - Name at Birth - HARVEY.

The HSCA: "What was the meaning of 'AG' under 'Other Identification' in OSWALD'S 201 file?" The CIA was asked to explain its significance because the HSCA believed "this term was considered to be of potential significance in resolving the issue of OSWALD'S alleged Agency relationship." (This researcher erroneously suggested to the HSCA that "AG" might stand for Agent or Agency.) The CIA claimed that "'AG' is the 'OI' (Other Identification) code - meaning 'actual or potential defectors to the East or the Sino/Soviet bloc including Cuba' - and that anyone so described could have the 'OI' code 'AG.'" This code was reportedly "added to OSWALD'S opening form because of the comment on the document that he had defected to the Soviet Union in 1959." The letters "AG" appeared on the 201 files of many Soviet and Cuban defectors. A November 15, 1974 CIA Handbook stated: "OI Code: a two letter symbol used in conjunction with the 201 personality records in the 201 system to record the association of an individual with organizations or activities of operational interest. OI Codes cover intelligence and security service affiliation, whether staff or agent, or known or suspect, as well as activities of DDO interest. There are two categories of OI codes for use by components:

(1) general OI codes

(2) OI codes assigned to a specific component for intelligence services or other specific organizations. The 201 system has the capability of producing machine listings of 201 personalities by OI codes. For example, if an OI code has been opened for the security service of a certain country, a listing may be compiled of all members of that service."

Ann Egerter reported: "The staff questioning made it clear that the HSCA wished to determine if OSWALD had an agent relationship with the Agency. She feels an effort was made in two or three different ways to get her to make statements that there was some such relationship. For instance there were the letter AG on the form employed in opening 201 files. She was asked if this meant Agent. She replied it did not although she could not recall what it did mean. She also made the point in her testimony that she did not handle agent files."

The CIA stated:

1. In June 1960 a new form 831 (for opening 201's) came into effect which made the old (October 1957) type form used by the OSWALD 201 obsolete. Since 201's are opened by the individual offices and not at a central point, the Records Integration Division allowed for an overlap period before not accepting the October 1959 form 831's. The June 1960 form was obviously geared for machine input and specifically has spaces for the machine codes. The analyst, (initials N.S.) who reviewed the 831 form on OSWALD and assigned the 201 number added the machine codes to the old type opening sheet.

A. The OI Code (Other Identification) "AG" means "actual or potential defectors to the East or the Sino/Soviet Bloc including Cuba." The analyst added this OI code because CI/SIG (Egerter) had stated that OSWALD had defected to the USSR in October 1959. Any person who could be described as the above could have an OI Code "AG."

B. CI/SIG has been crossed out because the space now required a machine code (as explained in paragraph one above). The number "73" is called a "non-country code" which means in machine input language that CI/SIG (the office which had opened the file).

C. The number "074" is under category #10 "Country of Residence" not "047" under category #12 "Second Country Interest," as stated in HSCA letter of August 15, 1978. The number "074" is a "country code" and means the USSR.

(Note: The machine codes in Paragraph 1a, b, & c were obtained from a Machine Listing produced by IMS/Procedures Branch/EDIS (Electronic Data Input Section). It is a computer listing to identify computer fields. The IMS analysts also have handbooks entitled "Handbook for Analysis" which also specifies the same information).

In Section III, the information in the slot entitled COUNTRY OF RESIDENCE read USSR - 074 and the ACTION DESK read CI/SIG 731. The CIA explained: "The number 074 is a Country of Residence and means the USSR. CI/SIG has been crossed out because the space now required a machine code. It is a computer listing to identify computer fields. The number 731 is called a non-country code which means in machine input language CI/SIG." Edward Petty commented, "'Action Desk' can have several meanings. It could be that a report from the field that needs to answered. It could be a case or the place of residence of the file." The SECOND COUNTRY INTEREST read "SR." Finally, the file was marked Restricted and signed by Egerter. [CIA 2-524, 1-1-B, 1187-436, 593-252C]

A CIA Handbook stated:

RESTRICTED DOSSIERS

a. Access to a sensitive 201 dossier my be restricted by holding the file at the desk or placing it on restriction on Central Files.

(1) The dossier may be restricted by checking Box 2 on the 201 Personality File Action Request (Form 831) when the file is opened.

(2) The dossier may be restricted by holding it on a permanent charge from Central Files. (Note: To maintain the restriction of a dossier being returned to the Central Files for retention, a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021) must accompany the dossier).

(3) The dossier may be restricted and held in Central Files by submitting a File Restriction Notice (Form 2021).

b. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel of the restricting desk or persons authorized by that desk. Any request for the charge of a restricted dossier or any document within a restricted dossier held in Central Files will be forwarded with the entire dossier and a multiple-routed cover sheet to the restricting desk. This desk may then forward the file to the requestor or deny the request and return the dossier to Central Files. The desk will notify the requestor of a denial.

c. Anyone requesting a restricted dossier, or a document within a restricted dossier, permanently or temporarily charged to a desk, will be referred to that desk by Central Files.

d. Access to a restricted dossier located in Central Files is limited to the personnel he HSCA asked: "Why was OSWALD'S 201 file restricted? The form used to initiate the opening of the file contains a notation indicating the file was to be 'restricted.' This indication was considered potentially significant because of the CIA's practice of restricting access to the files of its agents to persons on a 'need-to-know' basis. The individual who actually placed the restriction on OSWALD'S file testified that this was done simply to allow her to remain aware of the developments that might have occurred with regard to the file. The restriction achieved this purpose because any person seeking access to the file would first have to notify the restricting officer, at which time the officer would be apprized of any developments." According to Ann Egerter, the who opened OSWALD'S 201 file, after more than one year of total disinterest in OSWALD (between the time he defected and the time the CIA opened a 201 file on him), the CIA was now intensely interested in him; so interested, it could not wait for a periodic check of his file, but had to have, instantaneously, knowledge of any intelligence officer who was interested in OSWALD so that the restricting officer would be apprized of any developments. A far more plausible explanation was that, due to the sensitivity of OSWALD'S mission, ANGLETON was interested in anyone who was interested in OSWALD.

The HSCA concluded: "Restricting access to a file was not necessarily indicative of a relationship with the CIA." Edward Petty agreed: "Restriction does not have any operational implications. It could." The initials NS appear on the bottom of the document, as do the letters CS Copy [Clandestine Services copy], OSWALD'S 201 number, and a still-deleted signature.

As stated, OSWALD'S 201 file bore no indication of his connection to ANGLETON because CI/SIG it was created by Ann Egerter and Jane Roman, who both worked for ANGLETON. These documents indicated OSWALD was a defector, not an operation. OSWALD'S 201 file was unwittingly forged by these ladies; OSWALD'S Agency connection was a secret even within the CIA. ANGLETON knew the system, and could easily have done this. Jane Roman's husband Howard Roman, was a close associate of ANGLETON. [Hersh, The Old Boys, p363] Edward Petty commented: "Jane Roman and Howard Roman worked in different areas of the CIA. Jane is retired, Howard had died. Remember, you dilute the whole business if you reach too far." Evidence existed that ANGLETON forged other 201 files.

William K. Harvey's handwritten notes concerning his talk with Sid Gottlieb indicated that he was considering assassinating a world leader and blaming it on the Soviets - with ANGLETON'S help. "Cover: planning should include provision for blaming Soviets or Czechs in case of blow. (Deleted). Should have phony 201 file in RI to backstop this, all documents therein forged & backdated. Should look like CE [Counter-Espionage] file." William K. Harvey's assassin would have a 201 file which was forged and backdated so that it simulated that of an Soviet or Czech assassin."Backstop" meant to provide bona fides that appeared to be real when checked. Other notes read: "RIS cover caution Bankruptcy - no Star eyes - JIM A." Russian Intelligence Service cover would be cautiously provided by ANGLETON. A false 201 file would be created.

The HSCA assessed William K. Harvey's notes and inquired: "Did the CIA maintain a dual filing system on OSWALD?" The HSCA investigated, but never published its conclusions. "When pressed on the possibility that there might be another such file elsewhere on OSWALD, she said that there would have to be a 'fake file.' When pressed on this she stated the word was an incorrect one, and that what would have been would have been a file folder with a piece of paper in it referring to the existence of an original file somewhere else, specifying where." [CIA MFR 5.23.78 OLC-78-2058; HSCA R p205; William K. Harvey's handwritten notes: Z-R Rifle Item 42 CIA cover ltr.; USDC-DDC 75-0944-Civ.] Cleveland Cram, a former CIA Staff member who conducted a study of CI, was contacted in August 1993. He stated, "It's conceivable you could create a phony 201 file, but when you got to checking on the 201 file, it would very soon become evident that there was no support for the documents in it, and people would start looking around and find out it was phony. The minute you get into something like that, you got one or two people involved, maybe four, you start fiddling around with trying to create a phony file and the first thing you know somebody says, not at the time, maybe five years later, ten years later, now especially when all this conspiracy crap comes out. It would leak. I was so long in the CIA and I know that it was very difficult, almost impossible to keep secrets. There are leaks like crazy. There is no connection to reality. What would be the object of creating a false 201 file? Bill Harvey, towards the end of his life there, when he was in ZR RIFLE, was getting a little bit flaky. He was on the marts about a pitcher or more a day."

Scott Breckinridge, a 26 year veteran of the CIA who spent 14 years in the Inspector General's Office, commented: "It was clear that Mr. Harvey and an associate initially contemplated trying to establish false files. It is equally clear to anyone will to pursue the question beyond its asking, that they did not do so. Why he did not cannot be recaptured factually today as Mr. Harvey is dead, but that he did not is clear. Perhaps he tried and simply could not. In any event it was not necessary to do so anyway if limited records were desired to enhance the security of the operation." Richard Helms gave authorization for ZR/RIFLE to continue on February 19, 1962, and on March 6, 1963. [HSCA CIA 3319, 3329] Helms told the HSCA: "The project so it could be funded, but my distinct recollection is that I told the case officer who was involved with this that this was to be changed in its concept, in other words, there was absolutely no point in having a professional killer on the payroll as such, and that he was to try and find something else for him to do." The memorandum in question stated: "For the purpose of ZRRIFLE activities, you are hereby authorized to retain the services of Principal Agent QJWIN and such other principal agents and sub-agents as may be required. This authorization will continue to be in force through December 31, 1962, subject to renewal at that time...Richard Helms." [CIA D002109]

Goldsmith: Was the case officer who handled this project William Harvey?

Helms: I always thought it was (Deleted). Maybe Harvey started it and (Deleted) took over it later. Maybe that is what happened...Harvey came to the Agency after many years with the FBI. He handled the Elizabeth Bentley case..." Richard Helms was asked if ZR/RIFLE used fake or cover 201's: "No, I don't know what was done (deleted)."

Goldsmith: a case where, at the very least, agency personnel were contemplating the use of a fake 201 file and possibly a fake operational file.

Helms: Yes it looks like that. But then his boss would have known about this. He would have had to get permission to do that. Somebody would have known about it.

Goldsmith: Again for the purposes of clarification, when a file is faked in the manner suggested by the author of these particular papers, how many people would know about it?

Helms: Well, the person who instructed it to be done, I assume his boss, the person who would do it, and whether anybody in RI or in the Registry would know about it is problematic. They probably would not."

Richard Helms also told the HSCA, "he was not aware of the one that you brought to my attention [William K. Harvey's phoney 201 file proposal] and I am not aware of any others. ZR RIFLE originally started out as an indication of a project which was supposed to cover a man who in turn had been taken on to have available an operational capability to kill people. A man was hired, before I was aware of these things. But anyway, after I became DD/P, I put on the shelf for good, all and any use of this capacity for killing people. We didn't need that."

After the assassination of President John F. Kennedy, the CIA searched its HT LINGUAL file for additional material: "Approximately 30 pieces of correspondence that were considered potentially related to the investigation of OSWALD'S case (even though not necessarily directly related to OSWALD) were discovered. None of these was judged by the CIA to be of any significance. These materials were stored in a separate HT LINGUAL file." The HSCA search of the OSWALD HT LINGUAL file yielded two index cards:

INDEX CARD ONE

OSWALD, LEE HARVEY SECRET: CI-Project/RE

USSR EYES ONLY November 9, 1959

7-305

[NR/RI NOV 20, 1959

Recent defector to the USSR. Former Marine.

WATCH LIST

DELETE 15/3/60 March 15, 1960

Initially this researcher believed the words "CI/Project/RE" stood for Counter-Intelligence Project, Russia, Europe. As a result of this the HSCA asked: "Did OSWALD ever participate in a Counter-Intelligence project?" Edward Petty stated, "That is ridiculous. Russia and Europe, in my experience, were never tied together in that particular way. What you have is divisions handling possible operations such as SR [Soviet Russia] Division, SB [Soviet Bloc] Division. "E" only came to represent the European Division much later than the date on this document. The European Division was always EE so its mixing apples and oranges." Edward Petty was correct.

One former CIA employee told the HSCA the notation was a convenient name used to describe the HT LINGUAL project. Another testified that CI PROJECT was the name of the component that ran the HT LINGUAL project, and "RE" was the name of the translator who had worked on the OSWALD documents. The CIA told the HSCA that "there existed an office within the counter-intelligence staff that was known as CI/PROJECT, a cover title that had been used to hide the true nature of the office's functions. This office was responsible for the exploitation of the material produced by the HT LINGUAL project. The Agency further explained that RE represented a former employee's initials." The testimony of RE - or identity - was absent from the HSCA's report.

The CIA: "(Deleted) The presence of the initials indicates that on November 9, 1959, RE placed OSWALD'S name on the 'Watch List' for the reason given on the card, to wit, 'Recent defector to the USSR - Former Marine.'

The CIA told the HSCA: "The number 7-305 indicates the communication (not necessarily written) to the Office of Security informing the latter of the Staff's interest in seeing any mail either coming from or going to LEE HARVEY OSWALD in the Soviet Union." The HSCA reported: "The CIA's response went on to state the handwritten number, 7-305 was a reference to the communication from the Counter-Intelligence Staff to the Office of Security expressing the Counter-Intelligence Staff's interest in seeing any mail to or from OSWALD in the Soviet Union." The CIA's Office of Security, acting alone over a 24-year period, ran over 91 separate mail-cover operations relating to individuals within the United States. That meant an average of 4 mail covers a year. According to the Rockefeller Commission: "Most of the cases involved CIA employees under investigation..."

Why was the first document on OSWALD routed to the Office of Security? Why did CI think that the Office of Security had a mail cover on OSWALD? The Office of Security did not run many mail covers. When it did it was a very select list. Was OSWALD that dangerous? What had merited this sort of attention? And if this degree of attention was paid to OSWALD by the Agency, why wasn't there a 201 file for him in 1959? Or was OSWALD being surreptitiously checked on by ANGLETON?

Edward Petty commented, "Where is this information from?" He was told, "From the HSCA Hearings." Edward Petty responded, "Certainly Office of Security didn't have a mail cover on him in the Soviet Union, you can be sure of that. I don't know why the Office of Security might have had an interest."

The CIA: "N/R-RI November 20, 1959 - this notation indicates that a name trace run in central files resulted in a NO RECORD on November 20, 1959." On November 2, 1959, the FBI received a State Department cable about OSWALD. The Bureau telexed the CIA and asked what it knew about him. "N/R-RI November 20, 1959," signified "that a name trace run through central records register [Records Integration] indicated that there was no record for LEE HARVEY OSWALD as of that date."

The words "Watch List" appeared on this card. The CIA claimed that an employee at HT LINGUAL placed OSWALD'S name on the Watch List: "On November 9, 1959, an employee whose initials were RE placed OSWALD'S name on the Watch List for the HT LINGUAL project for the reason stated on the card - that OSWALD was a recent defector to the Soviet Union and an ex-Marine." When HSCA requested the criteria used by the CIA in compiling a Watch List, the Committee was referred to this Rockefeller Report section: "Individuals or organizations of particular intelligence or Counter-Intelligence interest were specified in Watch Lists provided to the mail project by the Counter-Intelligence staff [ANGLETON], by other CIA components, and by the FBI. On the average, the list included 300 names, including about 100 furnished by the FBI. The Watch List included the names of foreigners and of U.S. citizens. The mail intercept project was programmed to provide support data (if possible) as to Soviet attempts to:

(a) Penetrate the United States Government and strategic defense industries.

(b) Recruit travelers to the USSR, including educational leaders, businessmen and students.

(c)Exploit United States defectors.

(d) communicate with Soviet illegals and spies

(e) Exploit Soviet exchange student contacts.

(f) exploit an disrupt dissident groups.

(g) as a by-product, gain operational information on Soviet censorship, passports, and official document regulations within the USSR." [NARA 1993.07.01.19:37:20:530370]

Although not as exclusive as the Office of Security Mail Cover list, OSWALD was among 300 people in the United States whose mail was watched so that it could be routinely opened by the CIA. Most letters to be opened by HT LINGUAL were selected randomly; only a few were selected on the basis of the Watch List, often compiled by ANGLETON'S staff. Who had put LEE HARVEY OSWALD, teenaged defector, on it? The CI/SIG or the FBI?

The most recent release of the information in this document was the word "Deleted" before April 15, 1960. The CIA had deleted the word "deleted" for 36 years. OSWALD was taken off the mail intercept Watch List just before the U-2 was shot down.

INDEX CARD TWO

OSWALD, LEE HARVEY CI/SIG/Egerter 9-580

WATCH LIST 10-288

August 7, 1961 11-323

Minsk, USSR

DOB: October 18, 1939

POB: New Orleans, Louisiana

Defected to Russia 1959. August 17, 1960, received undesirable discharge from United States Marine Corps Reserve. Reportedly expresses a desire for return to the U.S. under certain conditions.

DELETED May 28, 1962.

Reviewed by AE 10/4/62

The Agency's explanation of the second HT LINGUAL Watch List card was: "On August 7, 1961, the CIA Staff Officer who opened the OSWALD 201 file requested that OSWALD'S name be placed on the 'Watch List' because of OSWALD'S expressed desire to return to the United States," as stated on the card. In 1993 the CIA released the notation "CI/SIG/Egerter." As in the case of the OSWALD 201 file, Egerter had acted on ANGLETON'S instructions.

The card contained the numbers "9-580; 10-288; and 11-323." If the number 7-305 was a reference to the communication from Counter-Intelligence staff to the Office of Security expressing the Counter-Intelligence staff's interest in seeing any mail to or from OSWALD in the Soviet Union, then what CIA communications and components were signified by these numbers? The CIA provided no explanation. [CIA Res. to HSCA Req. 8.15.78 03203]

A handwritten notation indicated OSWALD'S name was deleted from the Watch List on May 28, 1962, about two weeks before he returned to America. Why was OSWALD no longer of intelligence interest to HT LINGUAL? If OSWALD were a bona fide defector, he might have been recruited by the KGB in the USSR then sent back to America. Counter-Intelligence should have been interested in all the mail he sent to and received from the USSR after his return to the United States.

The CIA stated: "Signification of handwritten notations on cards in HT LINGUAL file. Card Two: On August 7, 1961 (Deleted) asked that OSWALD'S name be placed on the Watch List for the reason that OSWALD 'reportedly expresses a desire for return to the U.S. under certain conditions.' On May 28, 1962 OSWALD'S name was removed from the Watch List."

The CIA stated it had only one general file on OSWALD however, "The single exception to the above statement concerns one HT LINGUAL document dated July 8, 1961 but discovered only on a review triggered by press publicity following the OSWALDS return to the U.S. in June 1962. The sensitivity of this intelligence precluded its inclusion in the OSWALD file in general circulation." [CIA 1634-1088]

The HSCA found two HT LINGUAL index cards on Marina Oswald. They indicated her name was placed on the Watch List on November 26, 1963. It took a Presidential assassination to get her on the list. The first card contained the markings CI/Project/RE 12-451 and the second, a June 29, 1965 card, had the markings CI/Project/PH.

The HSCA conducted a defector study to ascertain if OSWALD'S defection was suspicious. The Committee: "To determine which individuals the Committee would study, a letter was sent to the CIA requesting the names of persons who defected to the Soviet Union between 1958 and 1964." The CIA "provided a list of the names and variations of the names of 380 Americans who were in the USSR during that time period," entitled, "U.S. Persons Who Have or May Have Defected to the USSR Between 1958 and 1963." This list included the names of Communist Party members who made frequent trips to the Soviet Union or were there on official Party business, like Henry Winston. Winston could not be termed a defector. The names of emigrants were included in this list. Some had been in the Soviet Union for over 20 years. The CIA: "This listing represented U.S. persons, including some non-U.S. citizens, who owed some measure of allegiance to the United States, who had either defected or shown some interest in defecting." [HSCA V12 p404] The HSCA requested the CIA provide more information so that it could select, for a detailed analysis, those defectors who were most similar to OSWALD. The CIA provided a second list which was "a computer listing of the name, 201 file number, date and place of birth, and a compilation of information derived from the 201 file, as well as citations for various other Government agency reports." No HSCA investigators visited CIA headquarters and went through defector files there. Instead, the CIA gave the HSCA some of the files the Committee requested, "the vast majority of which" were in undeleted form. The HSCA conceded there was not always "an independent means of verifying that all materials requested from the Agency had, in fact, been provided. Accordingly, any finding that is essentially negative in nature - such as that LEE HARVEY OSWALD was neither associated with the CIA in any way, nor ever in contact with that institution - should explicitly acknowledge the possibility of oversight." [HSCA R 197] From the second defector list, the HSCA eliminated those who had :

(A) Been born outside the United States.

(B) Gone to the USSR some time other than the 1958 to 1962 time period.

© Remained outside the United States until 1964."

The HSCA focused on the files of 23 defectors from the original list of 380. The Committee then examined the request dated October 25, 1960, from the State Department Bureau of Intelligence and Research on 13 individuals whom it considered defectors. That list included the following:

(A) OSWALD.

(B) Seven individuals whose files the committee had decided to examine under the previous criteria: Mollie Block; Morris Block; Bruce Frederick Davis; William H. Martin; Bernon F. Mitchell; Libero Ricciardelli; Robert Edward Webster.

© Two individuals whose names appeared on the computer listing but had been excluded since they were not born within the United States [Joseph Dutkanicz and Vladimir Sloboda]

(D) Three individuals who had not previously been known to the committee as defectors: David DuBois; (FNU) Sergeant Jones; Sergeant Ernie Fletcher.

When the CIA responded to the October 25, 1960 request of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, two additional names were added to the original list of twelve defectors - Maurice Halperin and Virginia Coe. The HSCA had already selected Maurice Halperin from the computer list of 380 names, but had no knowledge of Virginia Coe.

Maurice Halperin (born March 3, 1936) was a specialist in Latin American affairs employed by the OSS during World War II. In the summer of 1967 Maurice Halperin assisted Soviet agents Martha Dodd Stern and her husband Alfred Kaufman Stern to secretly travel from Mexico to Czechoslovakia. Maurice Halperin traveled to the USSR shortly after the departure of the Sterns from Mexico; he was employed by the Soviet Government as a Latin American specialist and has "periodically renewed his American passport." This information on Maurice Halperin was compiled by JAMES ANGLETON. [CIA CSCI-316/01206-67]

The Committee requested all CIA 201 files on the 23 individuals from the computer list. It requested files on Joseph Dutkanicz, Vladimir Sloboda, Jones, David DuBois and Ernie Fletcher, since their names appeared on the State Department defector list. Finally, it asked for the file on Virginia Coe.

Out of the 29 individuals whose files were the subject of this request, five were immediately dropped. The CIA could not identify Jones (an Air Force Intelligence document existed about his defection); David DuBois and Virginia Coe had defected to China, not the Soviet Union; and the Martin & Mitchell file was too sensitive and could not be presented to the HSCA. Now the list was down to 24, on whom the Committee asked other Government Agencies to provide selected information. After this analysis, thirteen more defectors were eliminated: 5 for lack of substantive information; 5 for being Communist Party members who made frequent trips to the Soviet Union, or for residing outside the United States for an extended period of time before entering the Soviet Union; and three for remaining in the Soviet Union for over 20 years. The HSCA: "Thus, the defector study was reduced to 11 individuals, two of whom were married." Actually, three of the defectors were married. These three couples could logically have been eliminated from the study because OSWALD was single when he defected.

Anyone who defected to the Soviet Union at the height on the Cold War, and wasn't a hard core Communist ideologue, had to be a little crazy. Many of the defectors were just that.

Morris Block (born March 30, 1920) attended the 1957 Sixth World Youth Festival in the Soviet Union. After the conference, he traveled to Communist China, prompting the State Department to impound his passport for misuse. He tried to defect to the Soviet Union with a falsified passport in 1958. In 1959 Morris Block, his wife Mollie, (born November 6, 1912) and his child defected to Poland. They were transferred to Moscow, where they applied for visas to China. The Soviets suggested the Blocks accept Soviet asylum in September 1959, and later issued them Soviet internal passports for foreigners. They were sent to Leningrad. There, Morris Block had an affair with his Russian-language teacher, and his family left him and moved to Moscow where his daughter was hospitalized for a nervous disorder. After the Blocks were reunited, they decided to re-defect; however, their applications for Soviet exit visas were refused. Morris Block disconnected a loudspeaker broadcasting propaganda at his place of work. Molly Block granted an anti-Soviet interview to The New York Times. Finally, the Blocks were expelled from the USSR.

Libero Ricciardelli decided that exposing his three children to a Communist system of government could straighten out his domestic problems. In February 1959 he defected, contracted influenza, and was granted Soviet citizenship after he denounced the United States. By June 1963, the Ricciardelli family returned to the United States.

Harold Citrynell (born March 10, 1923) entered the Soviet Union with his wife and child on February 27, 1958. He was granted Soviet citizenship and remained in the Soviet Union until June 29, 1959. The FBI: "Subject was born in the U.S. in 1923 and served in the U.S. Army from 1942 to 1945. He graduated from the College of the City of New York with a degree in mechanical engineering and held many jobs in that field between 1950 and 1958. In February 1958 he took his wife and infant daughter to Russia and attempted to obtain Soviet citizenship...he returned to the U.S. in July 1959. His wife divorced him in 1962 and after holding several jobs in the U.S. he traveled to England and then to Bulgaria in 1964. After working for one month in Bulgaria he went on strike and refused to work. He had numerous difficulties in that country and eventually returned to the U.S. in 1965 and it appears that he is emotionally disturbed and suffers from a persecution complex." [From Legat London (163-2201) Director (165-70603) 8.12.67] That brought the number of relevant defectors down to eight. Two of these should have been excluded because they fit the not native-born American criterion, although their names appeared on the State Department list.

Vladimir Sloboda, a native of the Ukraine, was sent to Germany as a forced laborer during World War II. He enlisted in the United States Army in Germany in 1953. He became a United States citizen in 1958. After basic training in the United States, Sloboda was assigned in August 1958 to an Army Intelligence Group in Europe. He defected to East Germany in August 1960 requesting Soviet asylum. Vladimir Sloboda's CIA 201 file reflected that the "fact of Army countermeasures caused by the arrest of 154 MID [East German Military Intelligence] agents recently" was responsible for his defection. JAMES ANGLETON agreed: "The Sloboda defection was participated by increased Army security measures, according to (deleted) in January 1962. Our conclusion that Sloboda was in prior connection with the KGB turned on the facts that:

(1) Sloboda's prior KGB involvement was confirmed by (deleted) in January 1962. (It is our assumption that he made the same statements to the Army debriefers who spoke with him in early 1962.

(2) He was a KGB resettlement case.

(3) he later told an American Embassy official in Moscow that he had been blackmailed and framed in going to the USSR." Counter-Intelligence Staff member Newton S. Miler (CI/OG/SOV) prepared a report on Vladimir Sloboda on October 12, 1960.

On April 25, 1969, the CIA reported:

"The Office of Security file of (deleted) reflects that on November 20, 1960, (deleted), an employee of the Joint Overt Interrogation Center Berlin received a telephone call from an English speaking male identifying himself as 'your friend Vladimir.' The caller asked (deleted) if he had been to his mailbox yet, and when (deleted) answered in the negative, the caller said there was a letter in the box and he suggested that (deleted) pick it up. The caller added that (deleted) should not worry about the letter since it had been placed in the box by a secure means. (Deleted) retrieved the letter, which was postmark November 20, 1960, read it and immediately called his chief."

The text of the recruitment letter read:

"Dear Mr. Deleted. Don't be surprised at his way of contacting you and don't take rash action before considering the contents. After watching and studying your life and activities for some time in the United States, Austria (Vienna), in Zone (Ulm) and here in West Berlin we have concluded we might be of service to each other. From different sources we have come to know many details of your official and private life and we are aware that your present position gives you small chance for promotion, and we are aware of the financial hardships you must face. These difficulties could be much greater if we did not think of sending you this letter. Being aware of your slips and blunders in work we have not made any moves which could undermine your reputation with Col. Ross (Berlin) and Major Huey (Oberusel). It is believed you could draw the right conclusion from out attitude. It is enough to mention that we were able to learn much from the documents in March 1959 in Frankfurt Am Main when you were driving a hired car. Through your slips in handling your sources Wolfgang and Dieter, in whose path we put no obstacles, many things became known to us. The same is to be said about the sources you ran in Vienna under the cover name Porter. By so doing, we hoped to come to an agreement with you at a suitable time on mutually profitable terms. We could continue to relate information regarding your activities and work of your office known to us because of your mistakes, but this would be pointless. We offer you a business-like cooperation on terms profitable to both sides. There is no need to describe what we are. It must be clear to you. Since you are a man of reason and sound logic you must understand that cooperation will give you a chance to overcome financial difficulties and make savings for the future. Also, we could create conditions which would aid the growth of your prestige at your office and in turn help you get a better job on your return to the United States. If agreement is reached we will immediately provide you with a substantial sum to settle your affairs and guarantee you monthly pay in the future, higher than your salary, as long as you stay in contact. If you agree to our proposal, come to the democratic sector of Berlin for future talks. On November 20, 1960, from 1930 to 2000 hours arrive at the U-Bahn Station in Warchauerbruecks. A representative of our organization, Vladimir, will meet you at the flower shop at the entrance to the station...It goes without saying that if during talks we can't reach mutual agreement, that we will still guarantee you absolute security and safety. You face no danger during the talks. If we do not hear from you by December 1, 1960 we shall consider ourselves free to act. To assure you this letter is not a trap laid by your security service, we shall broadcast on Soviet Forces Volga Network an old waltz tune on November 20, 1960, at 1310. If this is not convincing, write us in advance what other piece of Russian music you would like to hear and when you would like to hear it. Write to Herr Gruneat, Berlin, Lichtenberg 1, Postschliessfach 34. When writing we recommend you do not sign the letter, using any fictitious return address you like...We would like to warn you that it would be a mistake on your part to show this letter to your chiefs, because in the long run this will only harm you. We know there is an instruction from Washington which deals with such cases and that is kept at the Security Section of Lt. Col. McCord's office. We do not like to resort to threats, and in principle blackmail runs counter to our working methods, but you must realize we may be forced to resort to certain measures, not to compromise you, but to stop your activities against us. So you have ample chance to get everything you are striving for. For this you must have courage and resourcefulness."

(Deleted) was of the opinion "that the Russian Intelligence Service was attempting to suggest that Vladimir Sloboda (MIG defector in August 1960) was being used in this approach." [CIA AC/FIOB/SRS Jerry G. Brown 4.25.69] Vladimir Sloboda had engaged in discussion with (deleted) regarding "Wolfgang and Dieter" who were assets. Vladimir Sloboda was clearly a spy seeking asylum, not an American defecting. The Russians quoted Vladimir Sloboda as saying that he defected because of his revulsion to the U-2 flights. He never returned to the United States. On March 23, 1962 ANGLETON'S Deputy, James Hunt, Deputy Chief, Counter-Intelligence, was consulted about questioning Mrs. Lilian Sloboda by (deleted) SR/CI/RED. [NARA 1993.06.18.17:30:46:900000 dated 3.28.62]

In 1965 the CIA prepared a report on Vladimir Sloboda, much of which was withheld. This report dealt with Vladimir Sloboda's knowledge of CIA personnel and a possible recruitment attempt by him. The document concluded: "It is not known whether Sloboda is affiliated with the Soviet Intelligence Services at this time. According to a December 19, 1962, Foreign Service Dispatch from the American Embassy, Moscow, (deleted)." [CIA Memo J.F. Meredith to Chief/FIOB 9.30.65]

Foreign-born Joseph Dutkanicz visited the Soviet Embassy, Washington, in 1952, made pro-Soviet statements, and listened to Radio Moscow. In 1954 the U.S. Army court-martialed Joseph Dutkanicz on charges of subversive activity. He was acquitted and allowed to continue his normal U.S. Army activities. In 1958, while he was stationed in Germany with the U.S. Army, he was approached and recruited by the KGB. A Western-bloc security investigation caused him to seek asylum in the USSR.

Joseph Dutkanicz defected to the Soviet Union in June 1960. JAMES ANGLETON commented: "Security investigations was immediate cause of defection. USAREUR Case Summary 2-62-2 indicated that DUTKANICZ told American Embassy, Moscow, official that he was under investigation for security reasons. He defected soon after, in accord with a KGB suggestion that he do so...A more significant indication of his KGB involvement before his defection is the fact that the special decree granting him Soviet citizenship was enacted three months before his arrival in the USSR." In 1962 Joseph Dutkanicz's wife, Lilian Dutkanicz recounted that after their arrival, Russian agents contacted her husband on a daily basis for a period of six months or more. After one year, her husband told her he wished to return to the United States and that she should tell the officials at the U.S. Embassy he had been blackmailed into collaborating with the Soviets. Joseph Dutkanicz's wife was allowed to leave the USSR. On November 15, 1963, Joseph Dutkanicz died in a hospital in Lvov, USSR. [FBI LHM 5.20.65 highly deleted no serial "Enclosure 105-189"]

Colonel Burke, an Army Counter-Intelligence officer informed Jane Roman that he suspected Joseph Dutkanicz had KGB connections only after his defection: "Dutkanicz had not been attached to the 513 MID but to a signal outfit in which his job was climbing telephone poles. The statement that both these men had prior KGB connections is not true. Army just suspected this to be the case after their defection. The statement that both men fled as the result of Army Security checks is not true. Both men were not under security check although the Army was taking an "informal look into" the activities of one of them." ANGLETON prepared a report on Joseph Dutkanicz's pre-defection KGB connections for the Department of the Army in connection with the Warren Commission report: "USAREUR Case summary 2-62-2 indicated that Dutkanicz himself told American Embassy officials in Moscow that he had been approached by KGB representatives in a bar near Darmstadt in 1958 and accepted recruitment as a result of their threats and inducements. He claimed to have given them a minimum for cooperation from then until his defection, although the Army considered it probable that the had done more than he admitted." [CSCI-316/01779-64 dated 11.7.64 NARA 1993.06.18:56:10:93000]

Lee H. Wigren, Chief, Soviet Research, Counter-Intelligence Research, noted Joseph Dutkanicz's wife indicated her husband had connections with the Counter-Intelligence Corps: "She indicated that their trip behind the Iron Curtain 'had been made possible because her husband worked for the CIC and was allowed to do things the ordinary 'GI' could not do. There are also penciled notations in the 201 file suggesting that his Army assignment may have included intelligence functions of some kind." [NARA 1993.06.18.17:18:53:500000 - CIA 893-910]

The file made a convincing argument for both defectors having prior contact wit the KGB. This brought the number of relevant defectors down to six.

In October 1961 Shirley Dubinsky (born March 11, 1925) wrote several letters to Premier Khrushchev asking for citizenship, then traveled to the Soviet Union, where her bizarre behavior caused her to be placed in a mental hospital. She returned to America in February 1963.

Nicholas Petrulli (born February 13, 1921; died in April 1982) was another mentally ill defector. Nicholas Petrulli visited the Soviet Union in August 1959 and believed he could land a high-paying job there. He went to the U.S. Embassy, Moscow, and renounced his citizenship. Richard Snyder administered the oath of renunciation. About two months later, Nicholas Petrulli realized he had made a mistake. The State Department declared him legally incompetent and he was allowed to return to the United States. Nicholas Petrulli had received a medical discharge during World War II based on a mental breakdown, and had received disability payments as a schizophrenic. [FBI Los Angeles JFK case #-11.24.63] Richard E. Snyder recalled, "The Soviets decided that they didn't want him. They looked him over for quite a while, the same as they did OSWALD. And they said, 'No, go home boy.' He was no longer an American citizen, which made for a bureaucratic tangle. The out that arose in his case was that he had been discharged from the Air Force on a mental discharge." After Petrulli returned to the United States the FBI interviewed his brother, Dominick Petrulli who said Nicholas "returned from Russia about three or four years ago; shortly thereafter the attempted to commit suicide, was committed to a mental hospital on Long Island and later moved to California. Dominick described Nicholas as